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BEYOND A CONCEIVABLE DOUBT

Beyond a Conceivable Doubt: The Quest
for a Fair and Constitutional Standard of

Proof in Death Penalty Cases
"[T]he execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a
constitutionally intolerable event."I

I. INTRODUCTION

The death penalty remains the most contentious issue in criminal law
jurisprudence, and continues to be challenged on both constitutional and
moral grounds. 2 What is most remarkable about American death penalty
jurisprudence is that it has traditionally focused on purely technical and
procedural aspects of the imposition of the death penalty, 3 despite the fact
that the most vulnerable plank in the arsenal of death penalty defenders is
evidence that innocent people have been, and will continue to be,

1. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., Sam Kamin & Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Death Qualification and True
Bifurcation: Building on the Massachusetts Governor's Council's Work, 80 IND. L.J. 131
(2005); James S. Liebman, Jeffery Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital
Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839 (2000); Michael
Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of Capital
Sentences that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV.
283, 284 (1989); Thomas J. Walsh, On the Abolition of Man: A Discussion of the Moral and
Legal Issues Surroundingthe Death Penalty, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 24 (1996).
3.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (challenging the death penalty based
upon age of the defendant); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (challenging the death
penalty based upon the mental retardation of the defendant); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361 (1989) (challenging the death penalty based upon status of defendants as juvenile
offenders); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (challenging death sentence based upon
the mental illness or incapacity of the defendant); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(challenging the death penalty based upon racial bias concerning the application of the death
penalty); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (challenging the death penalty based
upon insanity of the defendant); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (challenging
Georgia's death penalty statute as based on disproportionate sentencing as compared to
severity of the crime committed); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(challenging a mandatory sentencing scheme as unconstitutional because it eliminated all
jury discretion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (challenging the death penalty
based upon the death penalty being "cruel and unusual punishment"); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (challenging Georgia's death penalty statute as being arbitrary and
capricious).
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executed. 4
Perhaps no legal principle is more difficult to explain to the layman or
first-year law student than that of all the panoply of technical, procedural,
constitutional, and other legal grounds that may be set forth in appeals of
death penalty cases, actual innocence is not one of them. The U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed this to be a bedrock principle of American death penalty
jurisprudence in Herrera v. Collins, in which the Court held that "[c]laims
of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been
held to state a ground for federal habeas corpus relief absent an
independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state
5
proceeding."
criminal
Nevertheless, some commentators have found suggestions trending
towards a new constitutional standard encompassing innocence in the
concurring and dissenting opinions of five justices in Herrera who asserted
that the execution of an innocent person did indeed raise constitutional
issues. 6 This included the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor with
Justice Kennedy joining, 7 and the dissenting opinion of Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter, who recognized an "Eighth Amendment challenge to
[the death penalty] on the ground that he is actually innocent," and further
held that "[e]xecution of the innocent is equally
offensive to the Due
8
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Unfortunately, for those who see these opinions as portending such a
trend, a closer analysis of the O'Connor and Kennedy concurrence reveals
that the key to any future adoption of a constitutional standard
encompassing an actual innocence component will lie in the definition of
"actual innocence." In Herrera's case, for example, O'Connor cites with
approval the majority's finding that "petitioner is not innocent in the eyes
of the law because, in our system of justice, 'the trial is the paramount
event for determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.' 9 O'Connor
then concludes by stating that "the issue before us is not whether a state can
execute the innocent. It is . ..whether a fairly convicted and therefore
4.
See Eunyung Theresa Oh, Innocence After "Guilt": Postconviction DNA Relief
for Innocents Pled Guilty, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161 (2004) [hereinafter Innocence After
"Guilt"]; Michael L. Radelet, William S. Lofquist & Hugo Adam Bedau, Prisoners
Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 907 (1996); Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C.L. REV. 61
(2003); Tara L. Swafford, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring that Innocents are
Not Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603 (1995).

5.

506 U.S. at 400.

6.

Elizabeth R. Jungman, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1070-71 (2003).

7.

See Herrera,506 U.S. at 419.

8.

Id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

9.

Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Rehnquist, CJ., majority at 416).
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legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled to yet another judicial
proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt ....10
In other words, by equating "actual innocence" with "legal innocence,"
O'Connor implicitly rejects any finding of innocence made independently
of the fact finders at the trial court. This view seems entirely in accord with
the traditional view under which claims of innocence, independent of any
technical or procedural errors, do not constitute a constitutional ground for
appeal, or at least for habeas corpus review.
Thus, there appears to be very little basis upon which to predict whether
any judicially-created constitutional standard will soon emerge addressing
the most vulnerable aspect of the death penalty-namely, the danger that
an innocent person may be convicted even in a trial devoid of technical,
procedural, or constitutional errors.
Addressing that vulnerability has therefore been left to the legislative
and executive branches of state and federal government. An example of the
former may be found in the so-called "Romney Bill," which was pending in
the Massachusetts legislature in 2007.11 If passed, this bill would require
that a jury in a death penalty case find that there is "no doubt" about a
defendant's guilt of capital murder, and require that a jury find that there is
"conclusive scientific physical or other associative evidence reaching a
high level of scientific certainty."' 12 In addition, the Model Penal Code has
adopted a proposed provision that would permit imposition of the death
penalty only if the evidence does not foreclose "all doubt" of the
defendant's guilt. 13 Thus far, no state has adopted this provision, 14 nor has
Massachusetts passed the Romney Bill. 15 Examples of the latter include:
Illinois Governor George Ryan's moratorium on executions effective
January 31, 2000, based on an executive finding that the procedures for

10.
Id. at 420. The Court explains that a defendant who makes a proper showing of
actual innocence may have his federal constitutional claim considered on the merits;
however, "[t]his rule ... is grounded in the 'equitable discretion' of the habeas courts to see
that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of the innocent persons."
Id. at 404 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991)). Thus, "a claim of 'actual
innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits." Id.
11.
12.

H.R. 1511, 185th Leg. (Ma. 2007).
Id.

13.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(f) (1962).

14.

RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH

(1997), http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=292.
15.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the General Court, Legislative Tracking
System (2007), http://www.mass.gov/legis/185 history/hO1511 .htm.
PENALTY: THE INCREASING DANGER OF EXECUTING THE INNOCENT
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16
imposing the death penalty were fundamentally flawed in that state;
Virginia Governor Mark Warner's order of a complete audit of the crime
laboratory in that state; 17 and the Massachusetts Governor's Council on
Capital Punishment, which set forth a proposed burden of showing
the
18
absence of any "lingering or residual doubt" in death penalty cases.
Meanwhile, there has been a flurry in recent years of scholarly articles
and commission proposals advocating a heightened standard of proof in
death penalty cases, ranging from Elizabeth Jungman's proposed "beyond
all doubt,"' 19 Judge Leonard Sand's "beyond all possible doubt, ' 20 to the
above mentioned Massachusetts Governor's Council on Capital
Punishment. 2 1 That such proposals for enhanced burdens of proof in death
penalty cases may indeed be serving to blunt the most virulent challenges
to the death penalty itself on constitutional, moral, and ethical grounds is
evidenced by recent heated, scholarly backlash to these proposals. This
purports to show "the fallacy of a 'foolproof' system," contending that a

"workable 'no doubt' or 'foolproof system is an illusion ...
22

impossibly

expensive and a hopeless burden on prosecutors."
For example, Greta Proctor persuasively cites a number of cases in
which supposedly irrefutable scientific evidence, including DNA evidence,
was later shown to have lead to incorrect factual conclusions or defied the
23
experts' opinions of an "adventitious (DNA) match as one in 3.5 billion."

16.
Charles S. Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the Moratorium
Movement, and EmpiricalQuestions: Looking Beyond Innocence, Race, and Bad Lawyering
in Death Penalty Cases, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y L. 577, 579 (2004).
17.
Greta Proctor, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy of a Foolproof
System, the Focus on Reform, and the InternationalFactor, 42 GONZ. L. REv. 211, 248
(2007).
18.
MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT 22 (2004),
http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/docs/5-3-04Govemorsreportcapitalpunishment.pdf.
19.
Jungman, supra note 6, at 1089-91.
20.
Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Reinvigorating the Jury: ProofBeyond All
Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May be
Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1359, 1373 (2003).
21.
MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22.
22.
Greta Proctor, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy of a Foolproof
System, the Focus on Reform, and the InternationalFactor,42 GONZ. L. REv. 211, 240-49
(2007).
23.
Id. at 212 (showing that scientific evidence is "inescapably subject to error"; the
author relates several remarkable stories). Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon attorney, was
linked to a terrorist bombing in Madrid by an "absolutely incontrovertible" fingerprint
match. Id. at 242. The FBI released him after two weeks, acknowledging its mistake in misidentifying Mayfield's fingerprint. Id. at 243. In 2005, Texas executed Cameron Willingham
for the arson-murder of his three young daughters. Id. Governor Perry authorized the
execution over the objections of several arson experts who contended there was no arson

20081

BEYOND A CONCEIVABLE DOUBT

Proctor asserts that "[n]o evidence is foolproof

. .

. [i]nevitably, even the

most unfailing scientific evidence fails some of the time." 24 For that
reason, Proctor concludes, that "perhaps we must simply give up on the
inherent in
death penalty experiment altogether" and "[t]he problems
' 25
reforms."
any
through
resolvable
not
are
capital punishment
While it is undoubtedly true, strictly speaking, that "no evidence is
foolproof," it must also be true that disregarding all evidence on such
grounds would inevitably paralyze the criminal system and set up an
insuperable obstacle to any conviction. Capital cases are unique because
the punishment in such cases is so severe and permanent; however, it is not
so clear that if evidence in a capital case were subject to such a standard, it
should not also be applied to other cases in which a defendant faces a
severe punishment, such as life in prison. In this regard, it is instructive to
take note of a petition signed in May 2007 by 310 "lifers" in the Italian
prison system who preferred the penalty of death over life in prison and
demanded that the death penalty be re-introduced as an alternative to what
they considered to be the much more severe and cruel sentence of life in
prison.

26

Additionally, some who oppose a higher burden of proof in death
penalty cases may have a hidden agenda of opposing the death penalty in
any form. Presumably, such opposition rests on the theory that by
supporting any attempt to enhance its fairness, they undermine their
argument for total abolition. Alternatively, it may be reasonable to suspect
that those who support a higher burden of proof have a hidden agenda of
maintaining the death penalty by addressing its chief vulnerability and
thereby making it more palatable.
Debate will continue to rage in this country over whether the death
penalty should ever be imposed,2 7 particularly in light of the fact that the
European Union not only forbids its imposition in member states, but
28
condemns the practice as unworthy of any civilized society.
Nevertheless, there has always been a large percentage of the American
electorate who believe that the death penalty is the only just and
appropriate punishment for the most heinous of crimes. The case of State v.

involved in the tragedy at all. Id. at 234-44.
Id. at 242.
24.

25.

Id. at 255.

26.

Christian Fraser, Italy Inmates Seek Death Penalty, BBC NEWS (ROME), May 31,

2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pf/fr/-/2/hi/europe/6707865.stm.
27.
See Thomas J. Walsh, On the Abolition of Man: A Discussion of the Moral and
Legal Issues Surroundingthe Death Penalty, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 24 (1996).
28.
Krista L. Patterson, Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine
in the United States, 55 DuKE L.J. 1217, 1224 (2006).
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Brogdon 29 illustrates this view. In that case, the defendants kidnapped a
young girl and took her to a levee where they repeatedly raped her, forced
her to perform oral sex, and continually beat her with their fists. The court
30
characterized the crime as one "of unparalleled savagery and brutality."
The young girl had pleaded for her life and fought back repeatedly during
the attack. Eventually the defendant hit the young girl in the head with a
brick until he believed she was dead.3 1 While there will always be those
who believe that an appropriate punishment for such a crime is a "term of
incarceration," there continues to be a body of opinion that justice
requires
32
something more in terms of vindication for a civilized society.
It is the purpose of this article to maintain a neutral stance on whether
the death penalty as presently imposed is ethical, moral, or even
constitutional. Rather, it proceeds on the assumption that the death penalty
is a fact in thirty-six states, 3 3 and that as long as it is being imposed, there
is a moral imperative to make its imposition as fair as possible-regardless
of whether making it more fair would affect any political agenda for
maintenance or abolition. The body of death penalty jurisprudence 34
is
replete with consideration of such fairness factors as arbitrariness,
juvenile status, 35 mental illness and retardation, 36 discrimination, 37 proper
consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors, 38 and jury
impartiality. 39 However, the focus of this article is to analyze the proposed
standards of proof in death penalty cases with a focus on finding the fairest
29.

426 So. 2d 158 (La. 1983).

30.

Id. at 163.

31.
Id.
32.
See Robert Steinbuch, Reforming Federal Death Penalty Procedures: Four
Modest Proposals to Improve the Administration of the Ultimate Penalty, 40 IND. L. REv.
97, 98-99 (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703 (2005)).
33.
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2008),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf [hereinafter FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH
PENALTY].
34.
See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972).
35.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
36.
See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 403 (1986).
37.
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978).
38.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612
(Ga. 1974).
39.
See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976).
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and most workable standard.
After a comprehensive review of the history of the death penalty in Part
II, the rationales for its imposition in Part III, a brief survey of its
constitutional and legislative history in Parts IV and V, and a comparison
of the myriad burdens of persuasion applied in U.S. courts in parts VI and
VII, it is proposed that a standard of "beyond a conceivable doubt"
provides the fairest and most workable standard of proof in death penalty
cases.
Rejected as unworkable and impracticable are such proposed standards
as "beyond any doubt,"'4 ° "beyond all doubt, 4 1 "residual doubt, 4 2
"beyond all possible doubt," 43 "proof to a moral certainty," 44 and their
numerous proposed variations, on grounds that no decision ever reached by
human beings can ever meet such a standard.
Brian Zuanich has set forth three reasons why the premise of jury
certainty, upon which the "no-doubt" standard and its numerous proposed
variations are based, is faulty:
First, by design, jurors do not hear all the relevant evidence at trial. The
Rules of Evidence, for example, exclude otherwise relevant evidence
that the trial court deems unfairly prejudicial. Second, the evidence that
juries do hear, particularly in capital cases, is not always reliable. False
confessions are not uncommon and "perjury by prosecution witnesses is
the leading cause of error" in death penalty cases. Third, people with
40.
See Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Execution by Adopting the Model
Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv.

41 (2001) (citing Brian Zuanich, Note, Good Intentions Are Not Enough: The Argument
Against A Higher Standard of Proofin Capital Cases, 11 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.

221, 229 n.49 (2006)) (proposing three verdicts: "not guilty, guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and 'guilty by proof beyond all doubt"' the last being required for a sentence of
death).
41.
See Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death
Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25, 27-30 (1996) (citing Zuanich, supra note 40 at 230 n.59)
(proposing the application of a no-doubt standard only when the defendant maintains his
innocence. Reasonable doubt would be applied if the defendant maintained that he was only
guilty of a lesser offense).
42.

MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22

(proposing that juries must have no "lingering or residual" doubts of a defendant's guilt
before sentencing him to death).
43.
See generally Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Symposium: IV,
Reinvigorating the Jury: ProofBeyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher
Burden of Proof When the Sentence May be Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1359 (2003)
(proposing that the government must prove the defendant's guilt "beyond all possible
doubt" in order to seek the death penalty).
44.
See Jim Myers, Keating: Standard is 'Too Low', TULSA WORLD, June 23, 2001, at
1 (proposing the ambiguous standard of moral certainty in all death penalty cases).
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first-hand knowledge of the facts, such as the defendant
and
45
eyewitnesses to the crime, can obviously not serve as jurors.
Zuanich asserts that all such heightened standards of proof in death
penalty cases are therefore ineffective, arguing that "[a] disturbingly large
number of jurors do not even understand the prevailing reasonable doubt
standard,",46 and would be even more confused if presented with two
different standards-one for guilt and another for punishment. He therefore
concludes that "[u]ltimately the benefits of capital punishment outweigh
the miniscule risk of executing an innocent person, which is why the death
penalty should not be subject to a higher standard of proof."' 47 While it is
concluded herein that Zuanich's rejection of the heightened burdens
previously considered are well founded, it is submitted that a standard of
"proof beyond a conceivable doubt" would address all his grounds for
rejection, while at the same time, all but eliminating the chance that an
innocent person might be convicted. Part VIII analyzes and charts a number of high-profile death penalty
cases in order to illustrate how the various proposed burdens of proof might
have affected the outcome in those cases. For example, the Susan Smith
case is provided as an example of a case in which the evidence would have
satisfied a burden not only of "beyond a reasonable doubt" but also of
"beyond a conceivable doubt;" however, it would not have satisfied a
burden of "beyond all doubt."
In that case, Susan Smith was charged with murdering her two young
sons by locking them in her car and then sending the car into a lake where
the sons died while strapped into their car seats. After an extensive
investigation and search showed no signs of the car, Susan Smith finally
confessed that she had committed the crime and directed the search to the
exact location in the lake where the car sank. Only then were the police

45.
Zuanich, supra note 40, at 232-33 (citations omitted).
46.
Id. at 235. A study at Michigan State University found that over 30% of jurors
believed that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" requires 100% certainty that the defendant
is guilty. Id. (citing Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand
CriminalJury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension
Project, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 401, 414 (1990)). A study from Wyoming found that
over 15% of jurors believed that they should convict when there was a "better than 50-50
chance" of the defendant's guilt. Id. (citing Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors
UnderstandJury Instructions?A Field Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming,
33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 59, 99 (1998)). Half of the subjects of a Florida study did not
understand who had the burden of proof, believing defendant was required to prove his
innocence. Id. (citing David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat
to Justice?, 59 JUDICATuRE 478, 481 (1976)).
47.
Id. at 239.
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48
able to locate the car and the bodies of the two young boys.
The evidence confirming her confession was the fact that only she knew
the exact location of the car in the lake, which had already been extensively
searched by police with no success. This clearly supported a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is submitted that such evidence would
also have supported a finding of proof "beyond a conceivable doubt"
inasmuch as, along with other confirmatory evidence, the location of the
car was so difficult to find that only the perpetrator, or one complicit with a
perpetrator, could know the exact location.
However, such evidence could not eliminate the one-in-a-billion chance
that space aliens had sent Susan messages from outer space informing her
of the location of the car, or that conspirators had constructed an exact
replica of the car complete with clones of the dead boys and deposited them
at that exact location in the lake in order to frame her. "Beyond all doubt"
is simply an impossible standard to achieve.
The killing of Lee Harvey Oswald by Jack Ruby, 4 9 witnessed by
millions of Americans on live television in 1963, is a situation in which,
had the case gone to trial, the evidence would surely have satisfied a
burden of both "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "beyond a conceivable
doubt." Even in that case, however, the evidence could not have met a
burden of "beyond all doubt" inasmuch as it could not preclude the
possible though unlikely event that the video of the killing was in fact
staged in order to frame Ruby, and that a vast conspiracy of Dallas police
officers and government officials orchestrated the frame.
Indeed, those who might profess that at least this one case might meet a
standard of "beyond all doubt" might consider the fact that a large number
of Americans persist in believing that the video tapes of the moon landing
were fakes, and that no one in fact landed on the moon.5 0 By way of
analogy, it might be said that it is "beyond a conceivable doubt" that
Americans landed on the moon, but not beyond "all doubt."
Likewise, the case of Bruno Hauptmann, 5 1 the man charged with the
kidnapping of aviator Charles Lindbergh's baby, is examined as an
illustration of a case in which the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt"
was reasonably satisfied (though perhaps only barely), but where a standard

48.

Lawyer Says Mother Will Face Death Penalty in Drowning of Sons, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 16, 1995, at 10.
49.

Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).

50.

See,

e.g.,

Bad

Astronomy,

Fox

TV

and

the

Apollo

Moon

Hoax,

http://www.badastronomy.com/bad/tv/foxapollo.html (last modified Aug. 8, 2007); The
Faked Apollo Landing, http://www.ufos-aliens.co.uk/ cosmicapollo.html (last updated Sept.
12, 2006); Was The Apollo Moon Landing Fake?, http://www.apfn.org/apfn/moon.htm (last
updated May 13, 2007).
51.
State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).
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of "beyond a conceivable doubt" had it been applied, would almost surely
have resulted in a life sentence rather than death.
Finally, Part VIII sets forth proposed standards and procedures for
applying a standard of "beyond a conceivable doubt" in death penalty
cases.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY

A. Early References to the Death Penalty
The earliest recorded references to the death penalty are found in the
Ancient Laws of China and as far back as the eighteenth century B.C. and
the Code of King Hammurabi of Babylon. 52 The oldest recorded death
sentence in Egypt is some 1500 years before Christ. 53 Also recorded is that
instead of burying executed criminals the Egyptians gave their bodies to the
beasts. 54 In the fifth century the Roman Republic recognized several
crimes, pursuant to the Twelve Tablets, which warranted the death penalty.
These crimes included perjury, knowingly or maliciously burning a house,
and the willful murder of a free man. 5 The methods of inflicting death
were often cruel - the methods included crucifixion,
drowning criminals at
56
sea, and burial alive, among other methods.
B. The Death Penalty in America
The English primarily influenced early American criminal law. 57 At the
end of the fourteenth century, the English law prescribed the death penalty
for "eight major capital crimes [including] treason, petty treason (killing a
person with malice), murder, larceny, robbery, burglary, rape, and

52.

See generally SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE

DEATH PENALTY

1 (Laura E. Randa ed., 1997).

53.

Id.

54.

JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

2 (1963).

55.
Id. at 3. In 451-450 B.C. the following were recognized as crimes to be punished
by death: publishing libels and insulting songs, furtively cutting or causing to be grazed
crops raised by plowing, theft by a slave who is taken in the act, cheating by a patron of his
client, willful murder of a parent, and making disturbances in the city at night. Id. During
the Republic, death was enacted for even more crimes. The death penalty was abolished for
citizens in 299 B.C., only to be restored again later. Id.
56.
SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 52, at 1. The most notorious death
execution in this era occurred in 399 B.C. "when the Greek philosopher Socrates was
required to drink poison for heresy and corruption of youth." Id. at 2.
57.

ed. 1982).

HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA

6 (Hugo Adam Bedau, 3d
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arson." 58 In this regard, "Britain influenced" America's use of the death
penalty "more than any other country." 59 "In Britain, the number of capital
offenses increased until the 1700s when two hundred and twenty-two
crimes were punishable by death."' 60 Early settlers brought the practice of
capital punishment with them. However, death was only prescribed for
"premeditated murder, sodomy, witchcraft, adultery, idolatry, blasphemy,
assault in anger, rape, statutory rape, manstealing, perjury in a capital trial,
rebellion, manslaughter, poisoning and bestiality." 6 1 "The first recorded
execution in the... colonies" occurred in 1608.62
Traditionally, under English law, death penalties were mandatory. 63 The
American colonies rejected the mandatory death penalty in favor of a new
practice; dividing murder into degrees of seriousness and granting juries
some sentencing discretion in capital cases. 64 In 1793, the division of
murder was first proposed by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
William Bradford, who stipulated that only first-degree murder should be
punishable by death.6 5 Thus, Pennsylvania not only introduced the notion
of degrees of murder, but also went beyond the English definition of this
term and included the category of "first-degree" murder. 66 First-degree
murder was defined as including all homicides "committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetuate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary
.... ,,67 By the twentieth century, most states followed the example of
Pennsylvania and adopted "degrees" of murder, with the death penalty

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 334 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
SOCIETY's FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 52, at 2.
60.
Id. at 3.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. ("Officials executed George Kendall of Virginia for supposedly plotting to
betray the British to the Spanish.").
63.
Id. at 10.
64. Id.Maryland introduced jury sentencing discretion in 1809 for treason, rape and
arson, but not homicide. Id. From 1860 until 1890, twenty states and the federal government
adopted similar practices. Id.
65.
Id. at 4.
58.
59.

66.

Id.

67.
Id. This is known as the felony murder rule. William Bradford, the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, stated:
All murder, which shall be perpetuated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or
by any other kinds of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetuate arson, rape, robbery or
burglary shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree.
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68
reserved only for murder of the first degree.
The nineteenth century witnessed a growth in the anti-death penalty
sentiment in the United States. From 1830-1840 a serious abolitionist
campaign developed in parts of the North. 6 9 During this time, three states
abolished the death penalty. 70 Michigan was the first English-speaking
territory in the world to abolish the death penalty. 7 1 However, "[t]he
greatest success of the movement . . .was not abolition, but rather the
' 72
removal of executions from the public square to behind prison walls."
Pennsylvania was the first state to abolish public executions by hanging in
1834.73 Eleven years
later, every state in New England also abolished
74
executions.
public
During the Civil War, the anti-death penalty movement weakened as
focus shifted to the anti-slavery movement. 75 After the war, the death
penalty advocates developed new methods of execution. Electrocution as a
means of punishment emerged in the late 1800s. 76 It was first adopted by
the state of New York in 1888. 7 7 Soon after, several other states adopted
this method of execution. 78 The abolition of a state's death penalty was
sporadic after the Civil War; however, it did occur. 7 9 Iowa abolished the
death penalty for a six-year span from 1872-1878.80 Maine abolished the

68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 21.
70.
SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 52, at 6. In 1852, Rhode Island abolished
the death penalty and Massachusetts limited its death penalty as only applicable in cases of
first-degree murder. Wisconsin abolished its death penalty in 1853, following an execution
in which it took nearly twenty minutes for the condemned to die. Id.
71.
Id. at 6 (stating that Michigan allowed the death penalty to be used for treason
against the state, but has had no executions since 1830).
72.
Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner: The Influence of Western Religion
on the Death Penalty, 9 WM.& MARY BILL RTs. J. 137, 159 (2000). "Public executions
were attacked as cruel. Sometimes tens of thousands of eager viewers would show up to
view hangings. Fighting and pushing would often break out.... Onlookers often cursed the
widow or victim and would try to tear down the scaffold or the rope for keepsakes."
SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 52, at 5-6.

73.
Pa. Dept. of Corr., History, http://www.cor.state.pa.us/deathpenalty/site/default.
asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
74.
SOCIETY's FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 52, at 6.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at 7.
77.
LAURENCE, supra note 54, at 63-64. The decree to use electrocution was signed by
the New York Governor on June 4, 1888 and became effective on Jan. 1, 1889. Id.
78.
Id. at 65-66 (Ohio (1896), Massachusetts (1898), New Jersey (1906), and Virginia
(1908)).
79.
BEDAU, supra note 57, at 21.
80.
Id. at 23 tbls. I & 2.
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death penalty in 1876, restored it in 1883, and abolished it again in 1887.81
C. The Progressive Period to the Pre-Modern Period
Although three states abolished the death penalty in the mid-nineteenth
century, it was the first half of the twentieth century that marked the
82
beginning of the Progressive Period of reform in the United States.
Between 1897 and 1917, ten states abolished the death penalty as a form of
punishment. 83 Between 1906 and 1907, six states completely outlawed the
death penalty and three states limited its use to treason and first-degree
murder of law enforcement officials. 84 However, the tensions of the First
World War led to five of the six states reinstating the death penalty by
1920.85 Between 1917 and 1955 the death penalty abolition movement
slowed.
Three states reinstated capital punishment from 1919 to 1920.86 During
this time there was a resurgence of the use of the death penalty. Americans
were suffering through the Great Depression and Prohibition. At this time
many criminologists believed the death penalty was a necessary social
measure. 87 The federal law also made use of the death penalty. Under
federal laws, the sentence of death was imposed for treason against the
88
United States, for piracy, and for murder within the federal jurisdiction.
Between 1927 and 1963 the United States executed thirty-four people,
including two women. 89 In 1963, Victor Feguers was hanged for
kidnapping in Iowa. 90 Since 1963, only three federal executions have been
81.

Id.

82.

Death Penalty

Info.

Ctr., History of the Death Penalty, http://www.

deathpenaltyinfo.org (follow "Facts" hyperlink; then follow "History of Death Penalty";
then follow "Part I" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter History of the Death

Penalty] ("In 1846 Michigan became the first state to abolish the death penalty" for all
crimes except treason. In 1852, Rhode Island abolished the death penalty and in 1853
Wisconsin abolished the death penalty for all crimes).
83.
John F. Galliher, et al., Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital Punishment
During the Progressive Era and Early 2 0yh Century, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 538,

541 (1992) (discussing the ten states that abolished the death penalty: Colorado (1897),
Kansas (1907), Minnesota (1911), Washington (1913), Oregon (1914), South Dakota
(1915), North Dakota (1915), Tennessee (1915), Arizona (1916), Missouri (1917)).
84. See BEDAU, supra note 57, at 8-9.
85.
id.
86. Id. (stating that the three states that reinstated the death penalty: Washington,
Arizona, and Oregon).
87.
History of the Death Penalty, supra note 82.
88.
Rory K. Little, The FederalDeath Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
DepartmentofJustice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 347, at 362-63 (1999).

89.

Id. at 170.

90.

Kathleen Sween, Dubuque Murder Led to Last Federal Execution,

TELEGRAPH-
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91
carried out under the Federal Death Penalty Act.
The frequency of the death penalty was greatest between 1930 and
1940;92 indeed, 1935 saw a record number of executions with one hundred
ninety-one. 93 During this year, there was an execution in the United States
almost every other day. 94 After the 1930s, the death penalty was generally
used for only five offenses: murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, and
burglary. 95 Although at this time the death penalty was not on most
Rosenberg prompted [its]
people's minds, the trial of "Ethel and Julius
' 96
return... to the forefront of public attention."
The Rosenberg trial and convictions prompted a resurgence of debate
over the death penalty. 9 7 By 1967, executions in the United States
plummeted; in fact, there were no executions between 1967 and 1972.98
Petitions under habeas corpus were rare prior to World War II and became
more common as the federal 99courts became more concerned with the
federal rights of state criminals.
These opponents of capital punishment shifted from religious and moral
considerations to legal considerations, such as whether the courts imposed
the death sentence fairly and in compliance with constitutional
provisions. 100 The 1960s and 1970s saw several challenges to the
imposition of the death penalty in America. These challenges included the
disproportionality of the punishment to the crime; the defendants' state of

HERALD (Dubuque), Jun. 11, 1997, at 3.
91.
Joshua Herman, Death Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges
to the FederalDeath Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1777, 1798 n. 182 (2004) (stating that

there have been three executions under the Federal Death Penalty Act: Timothy McVeigh
executed on July 11, 2001; Juan Raul Garza executed on June 19, 2001; and Louis Jones,
Jr., executed on March 18, 2003).
92.

TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2005, at 10

(2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp05.pdf.
93.
94.
95.
PENALTY

Id.
Id.
HUGO ADAM BEDAU, KILLING AS PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE DEATH
IN AMERICA 7 (2004).

96.
See Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women, and the Death
Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 427, 438 (2000).
97.

Id.

98.
See Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REv. 811,815 (1995).
99.

See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,

1864-1982, 136 (1984) ("[T]his was the time when the United States Supreme Court
became sensitive to defendant's rights in capital cases and retrospective to appeals under the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment.").
100.
See Gerald Gottlieb, Document 46: Testing the Death Penalty 1961, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 120-23 (Bryan Vila and Cynthia Morris eds., 1997).
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mind at the time of the crime; and the age, mental capacity, and race of the
offender. 101
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101.
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding nothing to forbid the
imposition of the death sentence on one who is sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of
the murder); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that a jury could consider
the mental incapacity as a mitigating factor and that this was enough to protect the rights of
a defendant who suffered from mental illness or incapacity); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 818-38 (1988) (considering a juvenile who was fifteen at the time of his offense
was eligible for the death penalty); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986)
(remanding case to a lower court with instruction that if it found defendant to be insane, it
should not sentence him to death); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982)
(holding that states shall not impose the death penalty on one who does not possess the
intent to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that the death sentence
is disproportionate to the crime of rape).
102.
H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences
and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment,46 J. L. & ECON. 457 (2003) (noting that the
chart "displays the murder rate in the United States per 100,000 people between 1977 and
1997, along with the number of executions during the same time period. Following the first
post-Gregg execution in 1977, the number of executions increased to an average of about
twenty per year around the mid-1980s. After remaining stable until the early 1990s, the
number of executions started rising in 1993, reaching seventy-four executions in 1997. The
homicide rate was 8.8 murders per 100,000 people in 1977. It reached 10.2 in 1980, and
then started declining continuously until 1984. When the number of executions was
relatively stable in the late 1980s, the murder rate rose again, reaching 9.8 murders per
100,000 people in 1991. It began declining after 1991 and went down to 6.8 in 1997.").
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III. RATIONALE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Deterrence
Deterrence has been one of the most prevailing arguments in favor of the
death penalty. 103 Many proponents feel that "the death penalty, because of
its finality, is more feared than imprisonment." 104 The punishment is meant
to deter prospective murderers who are not deterred by the thought of life
in prison. "Deterrence is achieved when the fear of punishment prevents
[the] crime. According to this theory, a rational person, after considering
the likelihood of apprehension, the severity of the punishment,

. . .

and the

the ultimate penalty, will choose not to engage in the
swiftness of imposing
05
1
behavior."
criminal
There are two kinds of deterrence, general and specific. General
deterrence is used to suggest that executing murderers will decrease the
homicide rate by causing other potential murderers not to commit murder
for fear of being executed themselves. 10 6 General deterrence is the
regulating force that the threat of punishment has on all of society. 107 1Its
08
greatest value is in dissuading others from committing future crimes.
The death penalty may serve as a general deterrent to crime if a potential
offender knows that the contemplated offense is a capital crime and, due to
in that criminal
unwilling to engage
of execution, isrelates
the certaintySpecific
to the fact that the murderer who is
deterrence
activity. 109
executed cannot kill again.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has stated that capital punishment can
be based on deterrence. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
determined that the constitutionality of the death penalty largely relies on
two objectives: the first is the Framers' intent, and the second is the public
goals of retribution and deterrence. 10 Justice White has argued in dissent

103.

Ward A. Campell, Death Penalty Information Center Innocence Critique:

Critique of DPIC List ("Innocence: Freedfrom Death Row"), http://www.prodeathpenalty.
com/DPIC.htm (last visited Sep. 28, 2007).
JAMES E. WHITE, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 234-35 (8th ed. 2005).
104.
Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution
105.
Constitute Cruel and UnusualPunishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 189 (1998).
See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the
106.
Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 711, 715 (1990);
see also Mocan & Gittings, supra note 102, at 453 (examining the economic issues
surrounding the death penalty and deterrence).
See Aarons, supra note 105, at 192.
107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 191.
109.
428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
110.

20081
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that a mandatory death penalty is a readily effective way of achieving
general deterrence. III
In contrast, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Spaziano v. Florida and in the
plurality opinion of Thompson v. Oklahoma, maintained that deterrence
considerations alone were not a sufficient basis for carrying out an
execution. 112 He argued that the sentencer must consider whether there are
mitigating circumstances in favor of a sentence less than death, and that the
sentencer must find the defendant morally blameworthy before imposing a
death sentence. 113 Justice Stevens seems to require that death sentences
satisfy some measure of both deterrence and retribution.
However, Justices Brennan and Marshall have consistently opposed
capital punishment. 114 Justice Marshall believes that the death penalty is no
more of a deterrent to crime than life imprisonment. 115 He argued that
there is insufficient empirical evidence to prove that capital punishment is a
better deterrent than other forms of punishment. 116
Other Justices have argued that the deterrent value of capital punishment
is diminished without a swift imposition of punishment. 1 17 Specifically,
years of delay between sentencing and execution undermine the deterrent
effect of capital opunishment and reduce public confidence in the criminal
justice system. l The Supreme Court has found that the deterrent value of
any punishment depends on the speed with which the state administers a
sentence. 19 Justice Stevens determined that the deterrent effect hinges on
the promptness with which the state inflicts the punishment. 120 Delay in the
final judgment of conviction, including appellate review, unquestionably
erodes the efficacy of law enforcement. 121 However, the deterrent value of

111.
112.
U.S. 447,
113.

Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 87-88 (1997).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837-38 (1988); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
479-80 (1984).
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 479-81.

114.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231-41 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);

id. at 314-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). For an extensive consideration of Justices Brennan's
and Marshall's death penalty jurisprudence and the role of vigorous dissents, see MICHAEL
MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: THE RELENTLESS DISSENTS OF JUSTICES BRENNAN

AND MARSHALL (1996).

115.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 342-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).

116.
Id.
117.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
118.
See Justice Lewis Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1035, 1035 (1989).
119.
Coleman v. Balkcon, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981).
120.
Coppedge, 369 U.S. at 449.
121.

Id.
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22
even a speedily imposed death penalty is debatable. 1
In Harris v. Alabama, the Court noted that research studies fail to show
that the death penalty has a deterrent effect. 123 The Court further pointed
out studies to show capital punishment actually increases levels of
violence. 124 In fact, a fifty-six year controlled study conducted in New
York revealed that an average of two additional homicides occurred in the
month following an execution. 125 Many opponents propose the death
penalty has no 26
deterrent effect because it is imposed so "infrequently and

so freakishly."1

The Supreme Court in Gregg emphasized that deterrence is an issue for
legislatures rather than courts and juries:
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex
factual issue, the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures,
which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own
local conditions
and with a flexibility of approach that is not available
127
to the courts.

Today, many proponents feel the death penalty is no longer a deterrent to
crime, but rather a just punishment; "in recent years, the appeal of
deterrence has been supplanted by a frank desire for what [society] sees as
just vengeance." 128
B. Retribution
The principle of retribution suggests that a murderer should be executed
because he or she "deserves" or "has earned" the sentence of death. 129 For
some, retribution is justice for the crimes that were not deterred:
Retribution . . . is achieved when the offender receives punishment in
proportion to the harm that they have caused. Adherents to the
retributive theory of punishment contend that society has an interest in
ensuring the punishment of offenders. The objective of retribution is to
122.

Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 523 n.9 (1995).

123.

Id.

124.
125.

Id.
See William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is

the Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME DELINQ. 453, 481 (1980).
126.
Alex Kozinsk & Seth Gallageheri, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 25 (1995).
127.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 186 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 403-05 (1971))
128.

E.J. Dionne Jr., Capital Punishment Gaining Favor As Public Seeks Retribution,

CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1990, 178, 178.
129.
See M. Foley, Confessions of a Retributist, Soc. ACTION & THE LAW 9, 16-17
(1983).
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restore peace of mind to society and to eliminate private vengeance....
An additional rationale for the theory of retribution is that in killing
another, the murderer has forfeited his right to continue living. The
death penalty achieves its retributive function by imposing the ultimate
punishment for the ultimate violation of a person. 130
There are two categories of retribution: the first equates the crime with
the punishment, the second has a punishment in direct proportion to the
crime. 13 1 The first category has its base in such religious values as lex
talionis, more commonly known as an "eye for an eye[.]"' 132 Proponents of
this theory feel it is "more tragic for the innocent to lose their life than for
133
the state to take the life of a criminal convicted of a capital offense."'
Both the Old Testament and the New Testament quote the Lord as saying,
"Vengeance is mine, I will repay."' 134 This could read as though the Lord
will inflict the punishment, but the New Testament allows the state to
execute criminals in the name of God, stating, "[I]f you do wrong be afraid,
for [the authority] does not bear the sword in vain; he is the servant of God
to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer.' 135 According to the Bible, the
authority to punish comes from God. 136 The second category, proportional
retribution, requires that the severity of punishment be proportional to the
severity of the crime. 137 This category looks at the criminal act and its
accompanying punishment compared
with that of other criminal offenses
38
and their authorized punishments. 1
The Supreme Court in Gregg found that while retribution is no longer
39
the primary objective of the criminal law, it is not a forbidden objective.1

130.
Aarons, supra note 105, at 192-93.
131.
One observer has suggested that there are nine philosophical justifications that are
included within the concept of retribution. See generally John Cottingham, Varieties of
Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979).
132.

See STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE? THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING BY

DEATH 74-75 (1987); see also Joseph M.P. Weiler, Why Do We Punish? The Case for
RetributiveJustice, 12 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 295, 310-16 (1978).
133.
See BEDAU, supra note 57, at 308.
134.
Romans 12:19; see also Deuteronomy 32:35 ("To me belongeth vengeance and
recompence .... ).
135.
Romans 13:1-5.
136.
Id.
137.
See Aarons, supra note 105, at 193.
138.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1168-69 (1980). Margaret Jane Radin has
similarly divided retribution into "protective retribution" and "assaultive retribution." See id.
Protective retribution is most analogous to proportional retribution, while assaultive
retribution emphasizes the lex talionis aspect of retribution. See id.
139.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
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The Court felt that capital punishment might be "the appropriate sanction in
extreme cases because it is an expression of the community's belief that
certain crimes are themselves so grievous that the only adequate response
may be the penalty of death."' 140 However, opponents argue that a lengthy
and severe incarceration followed by execution of a death sentence may be
overly retributive. 141 Although retribution is fulfilled, the deterrent factor
raises some questions.
The Court found that any additional deterrent value of a seventeen-year
delay followed by execution, as compared with a seventeen-year delay
followed by life imprisonment, seemed minimal. 142 In contrast, the Court
in Furman determined that the overwhelming number of criminals who
commit capital crimes and go to prison does not mean that death43serves the
purpose of retribution more effectively than life imprisonment. 1
144
Opposition to the theory of retribution is based on moral grounds.
Opponents "argue that life is sacred and killing is always wrong, whether it
is done by [the] individual or by the state." 15 "It does something almost
worse than lowering the state to the moral level of the criminal: it raises the
criminal to moral equality with the social order."' 146 The American Civil
Liberties Union agrees, stating, "capital punishment is a barbaric remnant
of uncivilized society. It is immoral in principle, and unfair, racist and
in practice. As a remedy for crime it has no purpose and no
discriminatory
47
effect." 1
C. Innocence and Mistake
The Supreme Court in Herrerav. Collins noted that "[c]laims of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to
state a ground for federal habeas corpus relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding."' 14 8 This observation is confirmed by the data found in figure 2
140.

Id. at 184.

respecting denial of
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 n* (1995) (Stevens, J.,
141.
certiorari) (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972)).
Id.
142.
143.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972).
144.
Jennifer C. Honeyman & James R.P. Ogloff, Capital Punishment: Arguments for
Life and Death, CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI., Jan. 1996, available at http://findarticles.com/

p/articles/mi qa3717/is_199601/ain8736435.
Id.
145.
Hendrick Hertzberg, PremeditatedExecution, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 49.
146.
147.
Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Speaks Out Against
Scheduled Execution of Manuel Pina Babbitt (May 3, 1999), http://www.aclu-sc.org/
News/Releases/1 999/100267/.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
148.
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below, which shows the most common bases for the reversal of death
penalty cases.
The death penalty is an irrevocable sentence. There is some evidence
that mistakes have been made when people have been sentenced to
death. 149 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, forty-two
people have been found innocent and released from death row since
September 2000.150 However, this number does not differentiate between
5
those who are "actually innocent" and those who are "legally innocent."' '
Nor do these figures, even if valid, rebut the fact that the vast majority of
death penalty cases that are retried result in guilty verdicts.
FIGURE 2152
Basis for Reversal
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Proponents argue that the claims of innocence by those who have been
released from death row are based on legal technicalities, and not actual
innocence. 153 They feel these hypothetical claims of innocence are merely
delay tactics to put off execution as long as possible. 154 However, with the
way our court system operates today, there are many safety nets in the form
149.

Death

Penalty

Info.

Ctr.,

Executed But Possibly Innocent, http://www.

deathpenaltyinfo.org (follow "Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Innocence" hyperlink; then
follow "Executed Despite Doubts About Guilt" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
Innocence and the Death Penalty,
150.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (follow "Issues" hyperlink; then follow "Innocence"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 11, 2008).
151.
See id.
152.
See JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFERY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM:
ERROR RATES INCAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at app. C-2, C-4 (The Justice Project 2000).
153.
Mich. State Univ. and Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Arguments for and Against the

Death Penalty, 2000, http://deathpenaltycurriculum.org/teacher/c/about/arguments/argume
nts.pdf.
154.

Id.
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of appeals (see chart below). As has been observed, "[i]mprisoning
innocent people is also
55 wrong, but we cannot empty the prisons because of
this minimal risk." 1
FIGURE 3156
Results on Retrial
93% Guilty
16%
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FIGURE 4157
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D. The Safety of Society
The Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia stated that the death penalty
serves to manifest the community's outrage at the commission of the
crime. 158 The death penalty exerts a widespread moralizing influence upon

155.
Id.
156.
Id. at app. C-4.
157.
Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited, 84 JUDICATURE
64, 67 (2000).
158.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303 (1972).
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community values. 1
It is also seen as satisfying the popular demand for grievous
condemnation of abhorrent crimes and thus prevents disorder, lynching,
16
and attempts by private citizens to take the law into their own hands. 0
This feeling was again adopted in the Gregg decision. 161 The Court stated
that capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct. 162 Although this function may be seen as
unappealing, it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely
on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs. 163 The
state has the authority to defend its citizens from violence and crime. Its
mission is to promote justice and the good of its people. It does this by
punishing the criminal.
IV. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

A. Eighth Amendment
In 1791, Congress ratified the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and thereby codified the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 164 The idea behind this prohibition originated from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689.165 As originally conceived, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was interpreted differently than it is today. The
Clause was originally intended to protect people from the most barbaric
and excessive forms of punishment such as "disembowelment, public
dissection, beheading and burning." 166 It also provided protection against
all punishments which, by their length or severity, were greatly
67
disproportionate to the offense charged. 1

159.

Id.

160.
161.

Id.
Gregg v, Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).

162.
Id. at 177.
163.
Id.
164.
U.S. Const. amend VIII.
165.
Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 840, 853 (1969). Historians believe that the

adoption of cruel and unusual in the English Bill of Rights was in response to the "Bloody
Assize," an English treason trial in 1685. Id. at 853-54. During this trial, hundreds of people
were killed for their alleged treasons, including many who claimed they were not guilty. Id.
166.
See Matthew J. Giacobbe, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-A Prisoner
Must Prove That Prison Officials Acted With Deliberate Indifference to Confinement
Conditionsfor Such to Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.
Ct. 2321 (1991), 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 1505, 1505 (1992).

167.
See, e.g., Kristina E. Beard, Five Under the Eighth: Methodology Review and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 445, 449-59 (1997) (citing
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In 1811, the first judicial opinion in the United States on the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was handed down by the Supreme Court of
Error in Connecticut. 168 In that case, the court, following the defendant's
contention that the accumulation of prison time was illegal and cruel,
rejected his argument. 169 While there were only twenty other reported
opinions dealing with this concept prior to 1870, the fact that they were
scattered over fourteen different jurisdictions is evidence that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was widely
recognized. 170 In the 1870s, more courts began to deal with the subject and
by 1910, thirty-eight states had rendered opinions on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. 171
"From the very beginning, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Bill of Rights was a restriction on the federal government and not on the
states." 17 2 In a series of cases, the Court specifically ruled that the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the individual states. 173 The first United
States Supreme Court decision to consider the relationship between the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments was In re Kemmler decided in
1890.174 The primary rationale was that the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause protected citizens against the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment. 17 5 However, the Court upheld its previous
decisions and distinguished between the rights of states and the rights of
federal citizenship. 176 The Court concluded that freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment was not a national privilege. The Court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment "was not designed to interfere with the power of
the State to protect the lives, liberties and property of citizens, and to
77
promote their health, peace, morals, education, and good order."1

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (discussing the origins and developments of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the death penalty)).
168.

LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 9

(D.C. Heath and Company 1975).
169.
Id.; see also State v. Smith, 5 Day 175, 178 (Conn. 1811).
170.
Id.
171.
BERKSON, supra note 168, at 9.
172.
Id. at 13 (citing Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833); Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
173.
Id. (citing Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1915); Ughbanks v.
Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487 (1908); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892);
Eilenbecker v. Plymoth County, 134 U.S. 31, 31-35 (1890); Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72
U.S. 475,479-80 (1867)).
174.
175.
176.

136 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1890).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 448.

177.

Id. at 449.
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Although there was a second argument in the Kemmler case based on the
Due Process Clause, the Court did not give it much consideration. 178 The
first major change in the Eighth Amendment concerning the states arose in
1947. 179 In this case, the argument did not rely on the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, but on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here, the defendant sought to prevent Louisiana from a
second attempt to electrocute him, as the first attempt had been
unsuccessful due to mechanical failure. Justice Reed, writing for the
majority, stated that violations of Eighth Amendment "would be violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 180 Two years
later, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was incorporated into the Due Process
Clause. 181 The court stated, "[w]e are of the opinion that the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of a State is as 'basic' and
'fundamental' a one as the right of freedom of speech or freedom of
82

religion." 1

In 1952, Justice Douglas stated: "the infliction of 'cruel and unusual
punishments' against the command of the Eighth Amendment is a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, whether that
clause be construed as incorporating the entire Bill of Rights or only some
of its guaranties[sic]."' 83 Thus, it came as no shock in 1962 when the
Supreme Court held in Robinson v. Californiathat state statutes that inflict
cruel and unusual punishments violate both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.' 84 The Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to
mean that the states
had an obligation to apply the Bill of Rights to all
85
persons equally. 1

Gregg v. Georgia articulated two distinct criteria for courts to use when
evaluating Eighth Amendment challenges: (1) evolving standards of
decency and (2) proportionality. 186 Evolving standards of decency
describes an inquiry into the accepted societal consensus surrounding a
particular issue. 18 7 The punishment also has to respect human dignity and
178.
179.

Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436.
See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).

180.
181.
182.

Id. at 462.
Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1949).
Id. at 255.

183.

Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 93 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

184.
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause applies to states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit punishing defendants for being addicted to narcotics).
185.
Id. at 666.
186.
428 U.S. 153, 175-87 (1976).
187.
Id. at 179-82.
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cannot be excessive. 188 Two further inquiries are needed to detect
excessiveness. First, the punishment cannot involve an unnecessary
infliction of pain, and second, the punishment cannot be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime committed. 189 This led to arguments
that the Constitution guarantees the right to "human dignity."' 90 This right,
as protected by the Eighth Amendment, would prohibit the government
from imposing any punishment that degrades one's basic humanity. 191
From this perspective, the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment
because it is inherently dehumanizing.1 9 2 However, originalists, those who
adhere to the original intent of the Framers, reject any claim to a
constitutional right to dignity. 193 "If there is no explicit mention of 'human
dignity' within the Constitution, or within the extant documents of the
Framers, one cannot pencil it in to arrive at one's political or social goals.
Doing so, according to originalists, compromises the integrity of the
document and renders it meaningless."19 Justice Brennan argued that
inhumane punishments "are unconstitutional because they are inconsistent
with the fundamental premise of the Eighth Amendment that even the vilest
95
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity." 1
Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty have not been
exhausted. The practice of capital punishment has undergone numerous
changes over the centuries. It has seen the struggle of those wishing to
retain the death penalty for biblical, retributive, or other reasons, and those
wanting to see it abolished on fundamental humanitarian grounds. 196 The
Id. at 173.
Id.
190.
See Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 1 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); see
188.
189.

also Margaret Jane Radin, supra note 138, at 1144-48 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment
requires recognition of each citizens' inherent dignity).
191.
Radin, supra note 138, at 1144.
192.
See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death
Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, at 145,

148 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parents eds., 1992). Some Supreme Court Justices,
including Earl Warren and William Brennan, accepted the view that the Eighth Amendment
contemplates some kind of basic human dignity. Id. at 145; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.").
193.
Steven H. Jupiter, Constitution Notwithstanding: The PoliticalIllegitimacy of the
Death Penalty in American Democracy, 23 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 437, 461 (1996).
194.
195.

Id.
William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A

View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 329-30 (1986) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 273 (1971)).
196.

INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
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97
most significant changes, however, have occurred during this century. 1
In 1972, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia
drastically impacted the development of the death penalty in the United
States.' 98 For the first time in American history, the Court held the death
penalty, as then administered, was arbitrary and capricious, and in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 199 The unrestrained discretion
in administering the death sentences became unacceptable because of its
arbitrariness. The Court considered a sentence of death to be cruel and
unusual if: (1) it was too severe for the crime; (2) it was arbitrary, meaning
that some criminals receive the punishment while others do not; (3) it
offends society's sense of justice; or (4) it was not more effective than a
less severe penalty.2 00 In a five to four decision, the Court found the
imposition of the death sentence to be unconstitutional. 20 1 The Court was
sharply divided, and absence of agreement among the justices resulted in a
per curiam opinion from the court with each justice writing a separate
opinion.
Of the five justice majority, only Justices Brennan and Marshall believe
20 2
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment in all circumstances.
In his opinion, Justice Brennan argued that, compared to all other forms' 20of3
punishment, "[d]eath is a unique punishment in the United States."
However, because it has longstanding usage and acceptance in this country,
Brennan turned on his second principle, that the state may not arbitrarily
inflict unusually severe punishment. Brennan wrote, "when the punishment
of death is inflicted in a trivial number of cases in which it is legally
available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system."
The three most important opinions in Furman came from Justices
Douglas, Stewart and White. 20 5 Their opinions express a common theme of

UNITED STATES 73 (1996).
197.
Id.
198.
199.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Id.

200.
Id. at 305.
201.
Id. at 239-40 (consolidating Furman v. Georgia (No. 69-5003), Jackson v. Georgia
(No. 69-5030), and Branch v. Texas (No. 69-503 1)).
202.
Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
203.
Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204.
Id. at 293.
205.
See Robert Wersberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305, 315 (1983)
(stating that the "important opinions" in Furman "are those of Justices Stewart, Douglas,
and White, which conditionally suspend the death penalty, and which are the source of the
Court's later efforts in doctrine-making").
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arbitrariness and discrimination. 206 All three found fault with the death
penalty as it was then administered. 207 Justice Douglas found that complete
2 8
discretion allowed for discriminatory application of the death penalty. 0
Justice Stewart felt that unrestrained discretion led to a random infliction
of the death sentence, and the results of which are cruel and unusual "in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual., 20 9 Stewart
argued, as did White, that death is different from all other forms of
punishment due to its deprivation and finality. 2 10 Justice White expressed
concern with unbridled discretion because it enabled such infrequent
imposition of the death penalty that "the threat of execution
is too
2 11
attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice."
In 1977, the impact of Furman led North Carolina to enact a new statute
that made the death penalty mandatory for certain types of first degree
murder. 2 12 A number of state legislatures apparently believed that
mandatory death sentences for certain types of offenses would avoid the
2 13
problem of an inconsistent application of the ultimate punishment.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court ruled against North
Carolina and declared that mandatory death sentences violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 2 14 The Court found
that North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute failed under Furman,
stating, "[it] provides no standards to guide the jury in its inevitable
exercise of the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live
and which shall die." 2 15 Additionally, the Court stated that mandatory
sentences also do not allow the "judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious

206.

Id.

207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the
penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is
poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or
unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more
protected position.
Id.
209.
Id. at 309.
210.
Id. at 306 (stating also "it is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict
as a basic purpose of criminal justice").
211.
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
212.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976).
213.
Id. at 302.
214.
Id. at 305 ("This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.").
215.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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' 2 16
exercise of that power through a review of death sentences."
Under the Eighth Amendment, death eligible defendants are to be treated
as unique individuals. 217 Mandatory death penalty schemes do not allow
the "individualized" sentencing inquiry that the Eighth Amendment
demands. These schemes treat defendants as "members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty
of death. 2 18 Because of the qualitative difference between death and life
imprisonment, the Court found a need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. The Court held
that one of the most significant developments in our society's treatment of
capital punishment has been the rejection of the common law practice of
inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every person convicted of a
specified offense. 21 The Court found that a jury wishing to show mercy
by0
towards a particular defendant would avoid imposing a death sentence 22
simply refusing to find the defendant guilty of the underlying offense.
The Court found North Carolina's mandatory death sentencing scheme
departed from contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the
death penalty; thus, it was not consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. 2 21 The Court concluded:

While a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably be expected to
increase the number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill
Furman's basic requirements by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury
discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make
222
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.
B. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
In response to Furman, at least thirty-five states have enacted new death
penalty statutes. 223 These states attempted to address Furman's concerns
by implementing one of two types of provisions: (1) guided discretion "by
specifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 304 (noting that "[c]onsideration of the character and record of the
217.
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense," is a "constitutionally
216.

indispensable part" of any capital punishment scheme).
218.

Id. at 304.

Id. at 292-93.
219.
Id. at 302-03 ("In view of the historic record, it is only reasonable to assume that
220.
many juries under mandatory statutes will continue to consider the grave consequences of a
conviction in reaching a verdict.").
Id. at 303.
221.
Id.
222.
223.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
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deciding when to impose a capital sentence, or (2) making the death
penalty mandatory only for specified crimes." 224 Twenty-one states
enacted guided discretion, including Georgia. 225 The other fourteen death
penalty states eliminated sentencing 6discretion by imposing a mandatory
22
death sentence for specific offenses.
In 1976, four years after Furman was decided, the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether guided discretion was constitutionally permissible.
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court rejected the idea that the death penalty is
per se unconstitutional.2 2 7 In a seven to two decision, the Court held that
the death penalty could be imposed provided certain procedural safeguards
were implemented.2 28 The plurality opinion by Justice Stewart, joined by
Justices Powell and Stevens, held:
[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given
adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these
concems are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the
information relevant to the imposition of sentence
and provided with
229
standards to guide its use of the information.
The Court's opinion in Gregg is central to the constitutional validity of
guided discretion statutes. 230 Since Georgia used aggravating factors to
narrow the class of death-eligible offenders, "no longer can a Georgia jury
do as Furman'sjury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then,
23 1
without guidance or discretion, decide whether he should live or die."
Georgia's new death penalty statute proved to be the model for most
legislative reenactments of the death penalty. 2 32 Georgia provided for a
bifurcated trial wherein the first phase determines the defendant's guilt or

224.

Id. at 180.

225.
Id. at 179 n.23.
226.
Id. at 180.
227.
Id. at 177-78 ("For nearly two centuries, this Court, repeatedly and often
expressly, has recognized that capital punishment is not invalid per se."); see also Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
228.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89.
229.
Id. at 195.
230.
See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
231.
Id. at 197 ("As a result ...
'the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear
and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application."' (quoting Coley v.
State, 204 S.E. 2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974))).
232.

Id. at 195.

20081
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innocence.233
After a verdict, the second phase of the trial settles the question of
sentencing. 234 During sentencing, Georgia's statute provided that the trial
judge or jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, one of the ten
aggravating circumstances specified in the statute. 2 35 Evidence of these
aggravating circumstances includes the record of any prior criminal
convictions and pleas of guilty, or the absence of any prior convictions and
pleas. Every sentence of death and conviction is then automatically
236
reviewed by the state's highest court.
Although Georgia provided a model for other court systems, the Court
found that those procedures would not be the only permissible procedures
under Furman. Instead, the Court said that every sentencing system must
be met on an individual basis.2 37 As the Court stated, "we have embarked
upon this general exposition to make clear that it is possible to construct
capital-sentencing systems capable of meeting Furman's constitutional
'238
concerns."

In 1977, several state death penalty statutes were again effected when
the Supreme Court ruled that a death sentence may only be imposed when a
life has been taken. 239 In order to comply with Furman, Georgia, North
Carolina, and Louisiana revised their death penalty statutes to include the
death penalty for the rape of an adult woman. 240 The statutes in North
Carolina and Louisiana provided a mandatory death penalty for those found
guilty of rape, but Woodson invalidated those laws. 241 When Louisiana and
North Carolina rewrote their statutes after the Woodson decision, they
reenacted the death penalty for the crime of murder, but not for the crime of
rape.242

233.
234.

Id. at 163.
Id.

235.
Id. at 164 (finding conversely, "[t]he defendant is accorded substantial latitude as
to the types of evidence that he may introduce" (citing Brown v. State, 220 S.E. 2d 922,
925-26 (Ga. 1975))).
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

240.
241.

Id. at 594.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding death sentences

imposed under North Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute unconstitutional as
violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
242.
Coker, 433 U.S. at 594
[Nione of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in
addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence
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243
Georgia's statute retained the death penalty for the crime of rape.
However, in 1977, the Supreme Court, invalidated Georgia's death penalty
law for rape in Coker v.Georgia.244 The Court held that a sentence of
death for the crime of rape of an adult woman is a grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 24 5 The Court reasoned that rape does not compare in
seriousness with murder. 246 "[I]n terms of moral depravity and of the
injury to the person and to the public, [rape] does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life."24 7
In 1978, the Court extended the doctrine of individualized sentencing
determined in Woodson. 248 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court ruled that a
defendant in a capital case has an Eighth Amendment right during the
evidence relevant to his character
penalty phase to present any mitigating
24 9
or to the circumstances of the crime.
The Ohio law at issue in Lockett required the sentencer to impose the
death sentence unless it finds one of three specific categories of mitigating
evidence.250 The plurality opinion of the Court rejected the limits the
25
statute put on mitigating evidence that a sentencer could consider. 1
Because the Eighth Amendment and earlier Court decisions required a

for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes,
included rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.
Id.
243.

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972).

244.
245.
246.

Coker, 433 U.S. at 600 (White, J., majority).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 598.

247.

Id.

248.
249.
250.

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Id. at 606 (Burger, J., majority).
Id. at 607.

Once a defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one of seven
specified aggravating circumstances, the death penalty must be imposed unless,
considering 'the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history,
character, and condition of the offender,' the sentencing judge determines that at
least one of the following mitigating circumstances is established by a
preponderance of the evidence: '(1) [t]he victim of the offense induced or
facilitated it. (2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for
the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation. (3)
The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of
insanity.'
Id. (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1975)).
251.
Id. at 605.
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death eligible defendant to receive individualized sentencing
determinations, states may not restrain the sentencer's ability to consider as
mitigating evidence "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a
252
basis for a sentence less than death.
Thus, "the sentencer may constitutionally impose the death penalty...
as an exercise of his unguided discretion after being presented with all
circumstances which the defendant might believe to be conceivably
relevant to the appropriateness of the penalty for the individual
offender." 253 However Justice White's dissent argues, "the Court has now
completed its about-face since Furman .

. .

.

"

to a time where the death

penalty was imposed erratically and so infrequently that it is cruel and
unusual. 254

Justice Rehnquist also dissented, stating individualized sentencing:
[W]ill not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of
sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it. By encouraging
defendants in capital cases, and presumably sentencing judges and
juries, to take into consideration anything under the sun as a 'mitigating
circumstance,'
it will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally
2 55
unleash it.
Enmund v. Florida2 56 held that the Eighth Amendment forbids "the
imposition of the death penalty on one ...

who aids and abets a felony in

the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal
force will be employed. 2 5 7 The Court's decision again recognizes that the
death penalty is unique in its severity and its irrevocability.2 5 Thus, before
the state may impose a sentence of death, the state must focus on the
personal intent and cul ability of the defendant himself, and not merely
25
that of an accomplice. V
The Court stated that the law "has long considered a defendant's
intention - and therefore his moral guilt" to be fundamental in determining
the extent of his culpability. 2 60 The plurality takes the position that the
death penalty will serve as a deterrent "only when murder is the result of
252.
253.

Id. at 604.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 621, 621 (1978) (mem.).

254.

Id. (citation omitted).

255.

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 631 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Id. at 797 (White, J., majority).
Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 800 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)).
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premeditation and deliberation." 26 1 If a person does not intend to take a
life, the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed as a punishment
262
will not "enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act."
Justice O'Conner, joined by Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist,
dissented: "the Court should decide not only whether the petitioner's
sentence of death offends contemporary standards as reflected in the
responses of legislatures and juries, but also whether it is disproportionate
to the harm that the petitioner caused and to the petitioner's involvement in
the crime . ...
63 The lesson to be learned from Coker is that
proportionality also requires that the degree of harm and the degree of the
defendant's culpability should be related to the punishment imposed.26 4
Courts should consider the "unique and complex mixture" of the
265
defendant's motives, knowledge and participation in the felony.
Five years later, the "intent to kill" requirement of Enmund 26 6 was
modified by the case of Tison v. Arizona. 267 Tison upheld the death penalty
for major participants in dangerous felonies regardless of the defendants'
intent to commit murder. 268 Two key points arise out of Tison. The first is
the concept of culpability, and the second concerns the defendant's
involvement in the crime committed.2 69 In Tison, the Court ruled that a
death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime committed if the
defendant participated heavily or substantially in a felony involving a
homicide and acted with reckless indifference to the value of human life.2 7 °
The majority in Tison held that the standard applied in Enmund was
erroneous.
The participation in a major felony with reckless indifference
to human life is sufficient to satisfy the culpability requirement found in
Enmund.27 2 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented
from the majority and determined that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
deems the death penalty a disproportionate penalty for defendants who do
not take a human life. This divergence from previous court decisions and
261.
Id. at 799 (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
262.
Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).
263.
Id. at 816 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
264.
Id. at 814-15.
265.
Id. at 826.
266.
Id. at 782 (White, J., majority).
267.
481 U.S. 137 (1987).
268.
Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
269.
270.
271.
272.

See id.
Id. at 138 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 149. The intent requirement depends on whether or not at the time of the

homicide the defendant was aware of the risk of death. Id.
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the majority's conclusion demonstrates
the "profound problems" that exist
2 73

in capital sentencing cases.
In 1988, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma 274 ruled that a
defendant who was fifteen years or younger at the time of a murder could
not be executed. The vote was five to three with Justice Kennedy not
participating. The fifth, and determinative vote, was from Justice O'Connor
who concurred with the opinion only because the Oklahoma capital
punishment statute did not specify a minimum age requirement. 275 The
plurality opinion focused on the fact that society regards juveniles as an
age-based classification. The Court saw this as society's belief regarding
the adolescent's level of responsibility. 2 76 Childhood characteristics
include "less experience, less education," less perception, less
responsibility for their actions, less aptitude to evaluate the consequences,
and more7 susceptibility to peer pressure and emotional influences than
27
adults.
However, one year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky,2 7 8 the Court ruled that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty for a defendant
sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time the crime was committed.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the plurality in support of the death
penalty for these ages. 2 79 However, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens (the four Justices who participated in the plurality opinion in
Thompson) dissented in Stanford.2 8 The dissent argued two points. First,
juveniles lack the degree of responsibility for their crimes that the Eighth
Amendment requires. 2 81 Second, that the execution of juvenile offenders
does not further the stated goal of capital punishment, deterrence. 2 82 This
second argument stems from the culpability argument articulated in
Enmund.2 83 "[R]etribution as a justification for executing [offenders] very
much depends on the degree of [their] culpability[.],,28 4 The Stanford
dissent believed that juveniles
lack the culpability that makes a crime
285
warrant the death penalty.
273.

Id. at 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

274.
275.
276.

487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 823-25 (plurality opinion).

277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 835.
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

281.
282.
283.

Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 403.
458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982).

284.
285.

Id.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 403-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In 1989, the Court faced the issue of whether a convict, who was found
guilty at trial and who later became insane when the capital sentence was to
be imposed, could be executed. The five to four decision in Ford v.
Wainwright found that an insane convict may not be executed.2 86 The
Court used the historical credentials of Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke to
determine the issue. 287 Blackstone argues that the insane are not
accountable. "If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses
before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment,
he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed[.]" 288 Sir
Edward Coke expressed the same view. "By intendment of Law the
execution of the offender is for example,... but so it is not when a mad

and
man is executed, but should be a miserable spectacle both against law,' 289
of [extreme] inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others."
The Court argues that if a defendant does not perceive a connection
between the crime and the punishment, the retributive goal of the death
penalty is not satisfied. 290 "For today, no less than before, we may
seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has no
comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his
fundamental right to life." 2 9 '
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh ruled it does
not violate the Eighth Amendment to execute someone who is mildly to
moderately retarded.2 9 2 The trial court found that the defendant was
competent to stand trial, even though he had the reasoning of a six and a
half year-old. 2 93 The jury rejected the defendant's insanity defense. 294 Of

the thirty-eight states that allow the death penalty, twenty-seven bar the
retarded, including the United States Government
execution of the mentally
29 5
for federal inmates.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (Marshall, J., majority) ("It is no
286.
less abhorrent today than it has been for centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose
mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its
implications.").
Id. at 406-08.
287.
Id. at 407.
288.
Id. "Other recorders of the common law concurred." Id. (citation ommitted).
289.
290.
Id. at 409.
Id.
291.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
292.
Id. at 308 (O'Connor, J., majority).
293.
Id.
294.
As of December 31, 2005, twenty-seven states excluded mentally retarded persons
295.
from capital sentencing: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota,
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In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that while executing those with
diminished mental capabilities does not violate the Constitutional ban on
cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant's IQ and evidence of mental
retardation are mitigating factors the trial jury is entitled to consider during
post conviction deliberations prior to sentencing. 296 The Court was
297
reluctant to use mental age to exculpate a defendant from responsibility.
The court stated, "reliance on mental age to measure the capabilities of a
retarded person for purposes of the Eighth Amendment could have a
disempowering effect if applied in other areas of the law." 2 98 A mentally
retarded person could be denied any number of rights, such as marriage
for
2 99
example, because the person has a "mental age" of a young person.
C. Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court has faced several challenging issues in the debate
over the death penalty. In 1987, the Court was faced with the possibility
that race influences the infliction of the death penalty. In McCleskey v.
Kemp the Court ruled that a statistical study in Georgia, which revealed that
black defendants who killed whites have the greatest likelihood of
receiving the death penalty, does not prove discrimination in violation of
the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. 30 0 The issue in
McCleskey revolved around a complex statistical study that indicated30a1risk
that racial consideration entered into capital sentence determinations.
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Mental retardation is a mitigating factor in
South Carolina. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2006
STATISTICAL TABLES tbls. 1, 2 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/cp06
st.pdf.
296.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 311-12 (O'Connor, J., majority).
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.

300.
301.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Id. at 286 (Powell, J.,
majority).

In support of his claim, McCleskey proffered a statistical study performed by

Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth, and (the
Baldus study) that purports to show a disparity in the imposition of the death
sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent,
the race of the defendant. The Baldus study is actually two sophisticated statistical
studies that examine over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the
1970's. The raw numbers collected by Professor Baldus indicate that defendants
charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases,
but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1%
of the cases. The raw numbers also indicate a reverse racial disparity according to
the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the death penalty,
as opposed to 7% of the white defendants.

CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONFINEMENT

[Vol. 34:221

The statistical evidence consisted of the examination of over two
thousand murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s. 302 The
Court ruled that a mere racially disproportionate impact is not enough, but
that there must be proof of purposeful or intentional discrimination. 30 3 The
majority opinion stated four reasons "for shrinking from the implications"
of the defendant's statistical evidence: (1) the desirability of discretion for
actors in the criminal justice system; (2) the existence of statutory
safeguards against abuse of that discretion; (3) the potential consequences
for broader challenge to criminal
sentences; and (4) an understanding of the
30 4
contours of the judicial role.
The majority determined that statistics "show only_ the likelihood that a
particular factor entered into some decisions." 30 Jurors bring into
deliberations "qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience,
the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable." 30 6 Jurors use
their collective judgment based upon unique characteristics
of a particular
30 7
criminal defendant, which are difficult to explain.
The dissent of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens argue that the statistical evidence shows that there is a risk that
a capital sentence may be influenced by racial considerations. 30 8 They
argue that the majority does not take into account history and human
experience. 30 9 "Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if
the death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with
this
31 0
concern that an individual be evaluated as a unique human being."
V. CURRENT LEGISLATION AND RULES

Currently, thirty-six states, the federal government, and the military have
death penalty statutes. 3 1 Eleven of those states provide the death penalty
for more crimes than just murder, including treason, train wrecking, aircraft
piracy, and kidnapping. 3 12 Fourteen states and the District of Columbia do

Id.
302.

Id.

303.
304.
305.

Id. at 294-97.
Id. at 335 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 308 (Powell, J., majority).

306.

Id. at 311 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)).

307.

Id.

308.
309.
310.

Id. at 328 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.

311.
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 1; see also Pub. L. 93-366,
88 Stat. 404, 411-13, repealedby Pub. L. 103-322, § 60003(b), 108 Stat. 1970 (1994).
312. SNELL, supra note 295, at tbls. 1, 2.
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3
not have capital punishment.
In response to Furman, death penalty states have developed a variety of
sentencing schemes. In one variety, the defendant's trial is bifurcated with
a special post-conviction phase to address sentencing. Bifurcation is
divided into two phases-the guilt stage and the penalty stage. The purpose
is to allow the jury to consider mitigating and aggravating evidence at the
appropriate times. The jury recommends whether the defendant should
receive the death
penalty based on evidence presented during the
3 14

sentencing phase.

In certain circumstances the judge and ury can disagree as to the
appropriate sentence. In Ohio and Kentucky,3 5 the judge can only reduce a
jury's sentencing recommendation from death to life, but may not increase
the sentence from life to death.3 16 Arizona, Idaho, and Montana allow for a
single judge to sentence the defendant to either life in prison or death.3 17
Nebraska allows for sentencing by either a single judge or a three-judge
panel. 3t 8
Much controversy has arisen between the states' differing sentencing
schemes. Since the 1980s, courts are clearly deferring more to the jury for
death penalty sentencing. 3 19 The reasoning behind this is that jurors are the
voice of the community. 320 Judges view jurors as the "conscience of the
community" and do not want to disturb jury verdicts. 32 1 The opposite side
of the spectrum argues that in no other cases do juries sentence the
322
defendant, so why let them decide important death penalty cases?
313.

FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 1. The states with no death

penalty are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.

314.
315.

See BEDAU, supra note 57, at 334-35.
See Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell

v.

Mississippi

Seriously:

The

Unconstitutionalityof Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge

andJury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283, 284 n.3 (1989).
316.
Id. at 284-85.
317.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(b) (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(c),
§ 19- 2515(3)(b) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2007).
318.

319.
2000, at
320.
321.
322.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).

Steve Mills, In Death Cases, Jurors Don't Always Prevail, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28,
IN.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984).
See Mills, supra note 319, at IN.
Id.; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).

[This Court] has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.
And it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even
greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment,
since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury and therefore is
better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
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Alabama, and other states, originally intended the judicial override to serve
as a "check on runaway juries correcting
verdicts by citizens inflamed by
3 23
emotion ...[or] bent on vengeance."
In 1984, the Supreme Court was faced with its first direct challenge to a
3 24 Among other
jury override sentencing scheme in Spaziano v. Florida.
arguments, the defendant challenged the court's imposition of a death
sentence over the recommendation of the jury that he be sentenced to
life. 325 In the 6-3 decision, the Court found Florida's jury override scheme
to be constitutionally valid.3 26 After examining the nature and the purpose
of the death penalty the majority concluded that there was no constitutional
violation in a judicial death sentence. 327 In addition, the Court held a
sentencing by jury was not required under the Sixth Amendment. 328 No
court has held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury
determination of sentencing. 329 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall dissented to the opinion. 330 They argued that it is the jury and
not the judge who most aptly represents a community's standards which
play a crucial role in death penalty
cases including the evolving standards
33 1
Amendment.
Eighth
the
under
In 1992, the Supreme Court faced another challenge regarding jurors in
capital cases. In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court ruled that a defendant shall
be given the same opportunity as the State to dismiss for cause any juror
who would automatically vote one way or the other in the punishment of
death without regards to the evidence. 332 The Court held that a capital
offender is entitled to question prospective jurors to ascertain if they
believe in the automatic imposition of the death penalty upon conviction of
Id.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See Mills, supra note 319, at IN.
See generally Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447.
Id. at 449.
Id.

327.
Id. at 464.
328.
Id.
In light of the facts that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury sentencing,
that the demands of fairness and reliability in capital cases do not require it, and
that neither the nature of, nor the purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury
sentencing, we cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to
impose the sentence in a capital case is unconstitutional.
Id.
329.
to a jury
330.
331.
332.

See id. at 459. "The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right
determination of that issue." Id.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
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capital murder. 333 In the 6-3 decision, it was held that the refusal by the
trial court to inquire into whether potential jurors would vote one way or
the other violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 334 The Court found a juror who would automatically impose
the sentence of death would fail to consider evidence of aggravating and
as required by state statutes and the Court's
mitigating factors
335
instructions.
A. The Appeals Process
If an innocent person is convicted, there is generally little time to collect
and present new evidence. In Texas, the defendant only has thirty days
after the conviction to present any new evidence. 336 Perhaps the state with
the most restrictive rule in the United States is Virginia. 337 Defendants in
Virginia are allowed twenty-one days following a death penalty verdict to
present exculpatory evidence. 338 Sixteen other states also require a new
trial motion based on new evidence, to be filed within sixty days of
one and three
judgment. 339 Eighteen jurisdictions have time limits between
34 1
years. 340 There are nine states that have no time limit.
Representation during the appeals process for a death row inmate is only
assured during one direct appeal.34 2 If that appeal is denied, representation
is no longer assured.34 3 Thus, the defendant's opportunity to uncover new
evidence to prove his innocence is reduced. Many death penalty
convictions and sentences are overturned on appeal, but too frequently the
discovery of error is the result of finding expert appellate counsel, a
sympathetic judge willing to waive procedural barriers, and a compelling
set of facts which can overcome the presumption of guilt.
State prisoners may find relief at the federal level by the writ of habeas
corpus. 3 However, in 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Anti333.
334.

Id. at 729.
Id. at 727.

335.

Id. at 729.

336.

TEX. R. APP. P. 3 l(a)(1) (1992).

337.

Editorial, DAILY PRESS, Mar. 14, 2000, at 1.

338.

VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:l 5(b) (1992).

339.
340.
341.

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 411.

See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 6-7, 10 (1989) (holding that states are not
342.
required to provide counsel to indigent death row prisoners after direct appeal). However,
federal law allows for the appointment of counsel, once a case moves into federal habeas
litigation, but crucial issues may have been waived before then.
343.

See generally Giarratano,492 U.S. 1.

344.

E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266.
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act which sharply limits the
availability of that writ. 345 This recent narrowing requires the federal court
to reject all claims if the defendant did not follow the proper procedures in
state court. 3 4 6 For example, if the claim is not raised on a defendant's first
habeas petition, the claim, with rare exceptions, is automatically rejected
even if the government withheld the evidence the defendant needed.3 4 7
Clemency is the "last avenue of relief' and is sought from the Executive
Branch. 348 "Clemenc[y] in death penalty cases is extremely rare.",349 The
procedures for clemency vary from state to state. 350 Every state has a
pardon power vested either in their state governor or review board. 35 1 "In
Nebraska, Nevada, and Florida, the chief state prosecutor sits on the
clemency review board. ' 35 2 Texas requires a board appointed by the
governor to review all clemency cases. 353 The board is not required to meet
or hear
testimony. 354 There have been no pardons granted in Texas to
3 55
date.
Investing the clemency power in the governor can be problematic. The
governor is an elected official and there is rarely a review of his clemency
decision. 356 Therefore, there is a danger of political motivation. Of the
clemencies granted in favor of a defendant in the past3 twenty
years, many
57
were granted by governors as they were leaving office.

345.

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
346.
Barry Latzer, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 10-11 (1998). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 imposes time limits for filing habeas petitions where previously there were no limits.
Now a defendant must file the petition within one year of the last direct appeal. The Act also
bars multiple habeas petitions except for a limited number of exceptions which must be
authorized by the Federal Court of Appeals. Id.
347.
See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498 (1991).
348.

STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. IN CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMMITTEE

ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., (1993), INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
ASSESSING THE DANGER OF MISTAKES EXECUTIONS, available at DEATH PENALTY INFO.

CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=535.
349.

Id.

350.
351.
352.

Id.

353.
354.
355.

Id.
Id.
Id.

356.
357.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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B. Federal Death Penalty Statute
The federal death penalty has been part of our national structure since
our country's earliest origins.3 58 In 1790, the First Congress of the United
States enacted legislation providing the death penalty as a punishment for
certain specified federal crimes. 359 The Constitution seems to allow for the
death penalty: the Fifth Amendment, adopted in 1791, specifically
acknowledges the continued existence of capital punishment, stating that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital . . crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
... nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law .... 360
Prior to Furman, federal juries were given "practically untrammeled
discretion" in deciding whether a defendant would receive a sentence of
life or death. 36 1 However, following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Furman, Congress enacted a new procedure for aircraft piracy in 1974.362
The Anti-Hijacking Act imposed a bifurcated sentencing hearing, a list of
mitigating factors, and a list of aggravating factors. 363 In 1985, Congress
passed its second post-Furman death penalty legislation and amended the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to allow capital punishment for military
personnel convicted of certain forms of aggravated espionage. 3 64 In 1988,
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. 365 Under this statute, Congress
authorized the use of the death penalty as a sanction for an offender who
intentionally causes the death of a person while participating in a drugrelated criminal enterprise or other major federal drug offense.3 66 This Act

358.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he

first federal criminal statute provided a mandatory death penalty for that crime." (citing Act
of April 30, 1790, § 14, 1, Stat. 115)).
359.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (citing C. 9, 1 Stat. 112(1790)).

360.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
361.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
362.
Pub. L. 93-366, 88 Stat. 404, 411-413, repealed by Pub. L. 103-322, sec.
60003(b), 108 Stat. 1970 (1994).
363.
Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409; repealedby Pub. L.
103-322, sec. 60003(b) (1994).

364.
365.
366.

10 U.S.C. § 852 (2000).
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
Id. § 848(c).
A person engages in such enterprise if(1) the person violates a felony provision of
the federal drug laws, and (2) the violation is part of a continuing series of
violations of the federal drug laws undertaken by the person in concert with five
or more other persons regarding whom the person serves as an organizer,
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also provided for the sentence of death for an offender who intentionally
caused the death of a law enforcement officer during a felony drug
violation. 367
A major change in the federal death penalty structure occurred in 1994
when Congress enacted the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), which
extended federal death penalty procedures to over forty offenses. 368 An
additional four federal offenses were added to this list in 1996.369 Federal
law imposes
the death penalty for both homicide crimes and non-homicide
370
crimes.
supervisor or manager and from which that individual derives substantial income
or resources.
Id.
367.
Id. § 848(e) (stating "intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures
or causes the intentional killing ... of any Federal, State or local law enforcement officer
engaged in, or on account of, the performance of such officers official duties and such
killing results," if the person engaged in such conduct during the commission of, in
furtherance of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a prior
sentence for a federal felony drug violation).
368.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (2000).
369.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1286, 1292, 1296, 1330 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
370.
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Offenses, 2006 - Statistical Table (Dec.
2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp/htm (follow "Capital Punishment - Statistical Table
2006" hyperlink; then follow "Table 3 Federal Capital Offenses, 2006" hyperlink). The
Bureau of Justice Statistics lists, by state, the following as homicide-related capital crimes:
destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities resulting in death (18 U.S.C. §§
32-34); murder committed during a drug-related drive-by shooting (18 U.S.C. § 36); murder
committed at an airport serving international civil aviation (18 U.S.C. § 37); retaliatory
murder of a member of the immediate family of law enforcement officials (18 U.S.C. §
11 5(b)(3) [by cross reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111]); civil rights offenses resulting in death
(18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247); murder of a member of Congress, an important executive
official, or a Supreme Court Justice (18 U.S.C. § 351 [by cross reference to 18 U.S.C. §
1111]); death resulting from offenses involving transportation of explosives, destruction of
government property, or destruction of property related to foreign or interstate commerce
(18 U.S.C. § 844(d), (f), (i)); murder committed by the use of a firearm during a crime of
violence or a drug-trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(i)); murder committed in a Federal
Government facility (18 U.S.C. § 930); genocide (18 U.S.C. § 1091); first-degree murder
(18 U.S.C. § 1111); murder of a Federal judge or law enforcement official (18 U.S.C. §
1114); murder of a foreign official (18 U.S.C. § 1116); murder by a Federal prisoner (18
U.S.C. § 1118); murder of a U.S. national in a foreign country (18 U.S.C. § 1119); murder
by an escaped Federal prisoner already sentenced to life imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 1120);
murder of a state or local law enforcement official or other person aiding in a federal
investigation, murder of a State correctional officer (18 U.S.C. § 1121); murder during a
kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201); murder during a hostage taking (18 U.S.C. § 1203); murder
related to the smuggling of aliens (18 U.S.C. § 1342); murder of a court officer or juror (18
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In a federal death case, the opposing parties are litigating pursuant to
different standards of proof. To understand the FDPA, one must be aware
that the statute identifies aggravating and mitigating factors. Aggravating
factors include evidence in support of the death penalty, while mitigating
factors suggest against imposing the sentence of death. 3 7 ' The United
States must prove its aggravating factors in support of the death penalty by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant must demonstrate mitigating factors suggesting that death
is not appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence. If the government
meets its threshold burden, the jury is required to consider mitigating
factors. Once the jury has concluded its fact finding, it considers whether
"the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh the
factor found to exist that would justify a sentence of death or, in the
absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating
factor or factors
3 72
alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death.,
Thus, the FDPA is a "weighing" statute. It is the weighing process that
leads to the jury's ultimate decision as to whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death.373 The jury must unanimously recommend death or
the
374
court must impose a sentence of life without the possibility of release.

U.S.C. § 1503); murder with intent of preventing testimony by a witness, victim, or
informant (18 U.S.C. § 1512); retaliatory murder of a witness, victim or informant (18
U.S.C. § 1513); mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or resulting in death (18
U.S.C. § 1716); assassination or kidnapping resulting in the death of the President or VicePresident (18 U.S.C. § 1751 [by cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111]); murder for hire (18
U.S.C. § 1958); murder involved in racketeering offense (18 U.S.C. § 1959); bank-robberyrelated murder or kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1992); willful wrecking of a train resulting in
death (18 U.S.C. § 2113); murder related to a carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119); murder related
to rape or child molestation (18 U.S.C. § 2245); murder related to sexual exploitation of
children (18 U.S.C. § 2251); murder committed during an offense against maritime
navigation (18 U.S.C. § 2280); murder committed during an offense against a maritime
fixed platform (18 U.S.C. § 2281); terrorist murder of a U.S. national in another country (18
U.S.C. § 2332); murder by the use of a weapon of mass destruction (18 U.S.C. § 2332(a));
murder involving torture (18 U.S.C. § 2340); murder related to a continuing criminal
enterprise or related murder of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer (21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e)); death resulting from aircraft hijacking (49 U.S.C. §§ 1472-1473). Non-homicide
capital crimes: espionage (18 U.S.C. § 794); treason (18 U.S.C. § 2381); trafficking in large
quantities of drugs (18 U.S.C. § 359 1(b)); attempting, authorizing, or advising the killing of
any officer, juror, or witness in 'cases involving a continuing criminal enterprise, regardless
of whether such killing actually occurs (18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(2)).
371.
18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2005).
372.
Id.
373.
Id.
374.
Id.
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VI. THE EVOLVING BURDEN OF PERSUASION

It was not until after the Constitution was adopted that the rule requiring
37
proof of crime beyond a reasonable doubt crystallized in this country.
The reasonable doubt standard arguably replaced a higher burden of
persuasion - the any doubt standard. 7 6
In the thirteenth century, the practice of trial by jury "developed as a
substitute for the older methods of trial - trial by battle, by ordeal, and by
wager of law." 377 Jurors were not necessarily limited to determining their
verdict on the evidence presented at trial, 378 nor did the courts charge the
jurors on the applicable burden of persuasion. 3 79 Rather, jurors were bound
by their oath taken before "God that they would determine the truth of the

375.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged."); see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 n.6 (1972).
376.
Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable
Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975) (disputing the assumption that the adoption of
the reasonable doubt rule established a higher standard of persuasion when, in reality, it
reduced the prosecutor's burden of proof in criminal trials). Morano cites the increased
burdens placed upon the prosecutors, for example, emerging rules of evidence limiting the
prosecutor's ability to prove a defendant's guilt beyond any doubt, as well as the
defendant's ability to present evidence on his behalf, for the reduction in degree of certainty
necessary to justify a guilty verdict. Id. at 514-15.
377.
Id. at 509 (citing 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317-19,
323-27, 332-37 (7th ed. 1956) (discussing the development of the early jury system);
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 106-38 (5th ed.,
Little, Brown and Co. 1956); 2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 619-30, 645-56 (2d ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1898); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 69-74 (1898)).
378.
Id. (citing 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 377, at 317-19, 332-34; 1 JAMES F.
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 259-60 (1883)).
The means by which the jury was to inform itself of the facts so as to be able to
form an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not clear. Some
commentators suggest that verdicts were not, as a rule, based upon first-hand
knowledge possessed by the jurors and that a variety of methods, including the
calling of witnesses, could be used to inform the jury.
Id. at 510 n.29 (citing 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 377, at 333-34; 2 POLLACK & MAITLAND,
supra note 377, at 619-26; THAYER, supra note 377, at 122-36).
379.
Id. at 510 (explaining that the practice of charging the jury with the applicable
burden of persuasion did not develop until the seventeenth century) (citing 1 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 377, at 334-36; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 377, at 127; THAYER, supra note
377, at 112-13, 166-70).
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matters presented to them" 380 and acquit if they had any doubt in the
matter. 381 Because of the "emphasis upon the solemnity of the jurors'
duty" during this time period, the oath requirement appears to indicate that
the burden382
to be applied in criminal cases was very close to an "absolute
'

certainty."

Although the practice of jury summation existed as early as the
fourteenth century, 383 it was not until the seventeenth century that trial
court judges charged the jury with a consistent standard of persuasion to be
applied to the evidence presented in court. 384 "The standard of persuasion

that most frequently appears in reported jury charges during the
seventeenth century is the satisfied conscience test. Under this test, jurors
were to convict the accused only if they were satisfied in their consciences
that he was guilty." 385 The writings of Sir Edward Coke during the
seventeenth century suggest that the charges to the jury incorporating the
satisfied conscience test reaffirmed the high burden of persuasion of the
380.

Id. (citing

1

JOEL P. BISHOP,

COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 811 (1866); 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
405 (S. Thorne trans. 1968); 1 JOSEPH CHiTTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL

LAW 551-52 (3d Am. ed. 1836)).
Bracton, writing around 1250-1258, quotes the oath taken by jurors in criminal
cases as: "Hear this, ye justices, that we will speak the truth about what is asked of
us on the King's behalf, nor will we for any reason fail to tell the truth, so help us
God etc." Chitty quotes the oath taken by jurors in early nineteenth century
criminal cases as: "You shall well and truly try, and true deliverance make
between our sovereign lord the king and the prisoners at the bar, whom you shall
have in charge, and a true verdict give, according to the evidence, so help you
God."
Id. at 510 n.33 (citations omitted).
381.

Id. at 510 (citing FRANCIS M. NICHOLS, BRITTON - AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND

NOTES 400-03 (1901)). "Britton states: 'And let no falsehood be ever knowingly practiced;
for they cannot swear in a matter of greater moment, than in that of life and member."' Id. at
510 n.34; see also 2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 377, at 652 (indicating that
"'acquittals seem to have been much commoner than convictions in the last days of Henry
III' [ca 1260]")). But see THAYER, supra note 377, at 157 ("indicating that early criminal
procedure was weighted heavily in the King's favor").
382.
Morano, supra note 376, at 511.
383.
Id. (citing THAYER, supra note 377, at 112-13).
384.
Id. (citing 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 377, at 334-36; 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
377, at 127; THAYER, supra note 378, at 166-70). Professor Thayer relied upon Bushell's
Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), to show the growing predominance of in-court
testimony as the means of proof. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the
English courts began to require that jurors who had personal knowledge of the facts of the
case declare such evidence in open court as sworn witnesses.
Id. at 511 n.35 (citing THAYER, supra note 378, at 173-74) (citations omitted).
385.
Id. at 511-12.
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"any doubt" test. 386
During the late seventeenth century, a group of English philosophers including John Wilkins, Robert Boyle, Joseph Glanville, and John Locke rejected the prevailing doctrine that equated moral certainty with absolute
certainty. With this came the philosophical basis for the reasonable doubt
standard.3 87 This group argued that one could not be absolutely certain of
anything and that the concept of moral certainty could not demand such a
high degree of proof.3 88 Rather, they asserted that moral certainty required
only that no reasonable doubts exist about one's beliefs. 389 "Wilkins'
redefinition of moral certainty and Gilbert's application of the new
definition to the standard of persuasion in criminal trials substantially
contributed to the formulation and acceptance390of the reasonable doubt rule
as a replacement for the any doubt standard.,
It is traditionally believed that the first judiciary applying the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was in Britain in the case
of Rex v. Finney.39 1 This was a high treason case tried in Dublin in 1798
386.

Id. (citing Edward Coke, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF

ENGLANd 29, 137, 210 (London 1797)); Trial of Mr. John Udall, 1 COBBETT'S COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1271, 1281 (London 1809); Trial of Sir Nicholas
Throckmorton, 1 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS at 884-85).

387.
388.

Id. at 513.
Id. (citing Theodore Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable

Doubt, 20 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 299 (1959)).
389.

Id.

390.

Id. at 513-14.

391.
Id. at 515; Trial of Patrick Finney, 26 HOWELL'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS at 1019 (Thomas Jones Howell ed., London 1819); see Morano, supra note 376, at
515-26 (discussing that in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 n.6 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court referred to Judge May's theory written in 1876 that the doctrine first
appeared in Trial of Patrick Finney, 26 HOWELL'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
1019 and Trial of Oliver Bond, 27 HOWELL'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 523

(Thomas Jones Howell ed., London 1820)). Evidence suggests the Finney court was not the
first to charge the jury with the standard. "In [the Trial of James Weldon, 26 HOWELL'S
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 225], decided three years before Finney's Case,
the charges of two of the three presiding judges contain unmistakable reference to the

reasonable doubt rule." Id. at 515. "Baron George charged the jurors that 'if you feel such a
doubt as reasonable men may entertain, you are then bound to acquit him."' Id. at 516 n.64
(quoting Trial of James Weldon at 289 (emphasis added)). Justice Chamberlain "charged the
jurors that, 'if from the special circumstances any rationaldoubt rests upon your minds, it
will be your duty to acquit the prisoner."' Id. at 516 n.64 (quoting Trial of James Weldon at
286 (emphasis added)). In 1797, a Canadian judge instructed a "jury that, if it had 'any
reasonable ground of doubt,' it was the 'invariable direction of an English court of justice to
lean on the side of mercy."' Id. at 516 (quoting Trial of David Maclane, 26 HOWELL'S
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 721). In 1793, an American court in the state of

New Jersey "specifically instructed the jurors that, 'where reasonable doubts exist,' they
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during the Irish Treason Trials. However, in the Boston Massacre Trials of

1770,392 Colonial judges were charging juries with the reasonable doubt
standard.39 3 Despite its appearance in criminal cases during the late
Eighteenth century, 394 the doctrine of beyond a reasonable doubt did not
become the accepted burden of persuasion in criminal cases in the United
States until the mid-Nineteenth century. 395 Its growth in America
was
396

"gradual and the rate of acceptance varied from state to state."

The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is firmly ingrained
in American jurisprudence. 397 This fundamental principle has been traced
to biblical origins and has been shown to be substantially embodied in
Roman and Canon law. 398 Early English legal scholars, as well as
esteemed members of the court, have acknowledged this principle in varied
recitations of the maxim that it is better to acquit ten guilty people than to
399
convict one innocent person.
The presumption of innocence does not automatically establish the
burden of proof required to determine an accused's guilt or innocence. The

presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one
accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is
introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created. 400 The degree
should acquit." Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 1 N.J.L. 439 (1793)).
392.
Morano, supra note 376, at 516 (citing the account of the Boston Massacre Trials
appears in 3 L. KINVIN WROTH & HILLER B. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (1965)).
393.
Id.
394.
Id. at 519.
395.
See id. (discussing the growth of the reasonable doubt rule in America and the
adoption of the rule by the respective states).
396.
See id. (summarizing the adoption of the rule by the states).
397.
See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is
a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."); see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of
innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial
under our system of criminal justice.").
398.
See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 432, 454 ("Greenleaf traces this presumption to
Deuteronomy, and quotes Mascardius Do Probationibus to show that it was substantially
embodied in the laws of Sparta and Athens.").
399.
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; CHANCELLOR SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 94 (A. Amos trans. 1825); 1 MATTHEW HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROwN 24 (1st Am. ed. 1847). These works were written during the fifteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, respectively. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.").
400.
See Paul C. Smith, The Process of Reasonable Doubt: A ProposedInstruction in
Response to Victor v. Nebraska, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1811, 1834 (1995) (citing McCormick's
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of proof required to overcome the presumption of innocence is defined by
the prevailing burden of persuasion. 40 1 In the American criminal justice
402
system, the accused must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
VII. DEFINING

REASONABLE DOUBT

Commonwealth v. Webster 40 3 is representative of the time when
American courts began applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
"in its modem form in criminal cases." 404 Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Shaw defined reasonable doubt as:
[N]ot a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human
affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge ...but the
evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judgment, of those who are bound to act
4 5
conscientiously upon it. 0

Many courts adopted Justice Shaw's definition of reasonable doubt in the
nineteenth century, 40 6 with one court characterizing

the instruction as

"probably the most satisfactory definition ever given to the words
40 7
'reasonable doubt'

in any case known to criminal jurisprudence."

However, while the Supreme Court has held that proof beyond a reasonable

Handbook of the Law of Evidence 794 (2d ed. 1972)). Standards of proof vary in civil to
criminal cases. The lowest standard of proof for civil cases is a preponderance of the
evidence (more likely than not). A heavier burden of clear and convincing evidence is used
for civil or quasi criminal cases. Finally, a reasonable doubt standard is used for criminal
cases.
401.
See generally id.
402.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); see also Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850) ("[T]he evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt .
.
403.
Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 (1850).
404.
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 n.6 (1972) (plurality opinion).
405.
Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 320.
406.
E.g., Bone v. State, 30 S.E. 845, 847 (Ga. 1897); Carlton v. People, 37 N.E. 244,
247 (I11.1894); State v. Kline, 6 N.W. 184, 185-86 (Iowa 1880); Polin v. State, 16 N.W.
898, 901 (Neb. 1883); Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 601, 615 (N.J. 1857); Morgan v. State,
27 N.E. 710, 712 (Ohio 1891).
407.
People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 151, 155 (1866).
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doubt is a constitutional requirement in every criminal trial 40 8 and juries
shall be instructed on the necessity of such proof, 409 the Constitution does
4 10
not require a definition of reasonable doubt as part of this instruction.
The Supreme Court's lack of guidance on the instruction of the reasonable
doubt standard 4 11 has given rise to confusion and a wide lack of uniformity
in the treatment of its definition among federal and state courts. Not only
does the definition of reasonable doubt vary between courts, but the
jurisdictions also diverge on whether or not a jury is to be instructed on the
definition.
The Constitution does not require the use of any specific language to
convey the concept of reasonable doubt. 4 12 Rather, when reasonable doubt
is defined, the instruction shall be "taken as a whole," and this instruction
4 13
must "correctly convey[] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury."
that
Further, it must be determined whether there is a reasonable likelihood
4 14
manner.
unconstitutional
an
in
instruction
the
applied
the jury
Only once, in Cage v. Louisiana, has the Supreme Court held the jury
instruction defining reasonable doubt as unconstitutional. 4 15 The jury
408.
See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
409.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979) (explaining that "failure to
instruct a jury on the necessity of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can never be
harmless error"); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a
jury verdict are interrelated .... [T]he jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a

jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) ("[T]he Constitution neither prohibits
410.
trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of
course."); see also Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,
982-83 (1993); Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define or Not to Define,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1716 (1990).
411.
Regardless of whether the Court endorsed a specific definition, it is without
authority and cannot exercise supervisory powers over state courts to adopt the definition.
See Victor, 511 U.S. at 15.
412.
Id. at 5. Cf, Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887) ("[S]ome explanation or
illustration of the rule may aid in its full and just comprehension ....The rule may be, and

often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to create doubts instead of
removing them."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970) (quoting 9 Wigmore on
Evidence 325 (3d ed. 1940)) ("The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a
mode of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence there can be yet no
successful method of communicating intelligibly . . .a sound method of self analysis for
one's belief.").
413.
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The Court held that the proper inquiry
414.
is not whether the jury could have interpreted the instruction in an unconstitutional manner,
but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied it unconstitutionally. Id.
415.
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
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instruction in Cage provided in relevant part:
"[A reasonable doubt] is one that is founded upon a real tangible
substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be
such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your
mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack
thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual
substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously

entertain. What is required
4 16 is not an absolute or mathematical certainty,
but a moral certainty."
The Cage holding was unclear as to whether the three questionable
phrases of life, liberty, or property, had to be presented in the Cage context
for an instruction to violate the reasonable doubt standard, and whether all
three phrases had to be present. However, many courts have held that all
three Cage phrases are clearly required.4 17
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the confusion resulting
from Cage when presented with two consolidated cases: Victor v.
Nebraska, and Sandoval v. California.4 18 Despite finding portions of the
instructions "problematic," 4 19 "archaic,"' 420 and "quite indefensible," 4 21 the
416.
Id. at 40 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Cage, 550 So. 2d 39 (La. 1989)).
The Court has since held that a Cage error is plain error per se. See Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are interrelated, and
an instruction that violates the beyond a reasonable doubt standard also denies the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
417.
Matt Nichols, Victor v. Nebraska: The "ReasonableDoubt " Dilemma, 73 N.C. L.
REv. 1709, 1720 n.96 (1995); see, e.g., Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 984 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992) ("Obviously, it was not the use of any one of the terms in Cage, but rather the
combination of all three that rendered the charge in Cage unconstitutional."), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1012 (1994); Bradford v. State, 412 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. 1992) ("In Cage, it is
clear that it was both the definition of reasonable doubt, which impermissibly equated
reasonable doubt with a 'grave uncertainty' and an 'actual substantial doubt,' coupled with
the reference to 'moral and reasonable certainty' that invalidated the jury instruction."
(quoting Starrv. State, 410 S.E.2d 180, 182 (Ga. App. 1991)).
418.
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (consolidating State v. Victor, 494 N.W. 2d
565 (1993) and People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (1992)).
419.
Id. at 19. Justice O'Connor described the language allowing the jury to convict
based on "the strong probabilities of the case" unless there was a "substantial doubt" based
on the evidence as "problematic," but found the overall instruction did not violate the
Constitution. David Stewart, Uncertainty about Reasonable Doubt, 80 A.B.A.J. 38, 38 (June
1994).
420.
Victor, 511 U.S. at 23 (stating that the common meaning of "moral certainty" has
changed since Justice Shaw's instruction in Webster, but that, in the context of the
instructions as a whole, the Court cannot say that the use of the phrase rendered the
instruction unconstitutional.).
421.
Id. at 23 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

2008]

BEYOND A CONCEIVABLE DOUBT

Court upheld the jury instructions of both cases and did little to clarify the
reasonable doubt standard. In addition to confusion regarding the definition
of reasonable doubt, courts have
split on the propriety of instructing the
4 22
jury with any such definition.
In 1963, the American Law Institute (ALl) completed the Model Penal
Code. It seemingly advocated the replacement of "reasonable doubt" for a
standard of "beyond all doubt." 42 3 Concerning the imposition of the death
penalty, it included the provision that:
(1) Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of
murder, the Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first degree
if it is satisfied that:

California's use of "moral evidence" is the most troubling, and to me seems quite
indefensible.... I agree that use of "moral evidence" in the California formulation
is not fatal to the instruction here. I cannot understand, however, why such an
unruly term should be used at all when jurors are asked to perform a task that can
be of great difficulty even when instructions are altogether clear. The inclusion of
words so malleable, because so obscure, might in other circumstances have put the
whole instruction at risk.
Id. (internal quotation marks).
422.
See generally Diamond, supra note 410. Diamond compiled a list of federal
circuit courts and state courts which have required a judge upon request to give the jury
instructions defining reasonable doubt, namely the Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Eighth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and District of Columbia Circuit and the highest courts of
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Washington. Id. at 1718. Additionally, his survey concludes that California, Missouri,
Nevada, and Ohio, have statutes which define reasonable doubt for use in jury instructions.
Id. at 1719. In contrast federal jurisdictions where jury instructions defining reasonable
doubt are not required include: the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit,
and Seventh Circuit, and at the state level, the highest courts of Illinois, Mississippi, Texas,
and Wyoming have also held that they are not required. Id. at 1719-20. As further explained
by Diamond, the reasoning used by these latter courts "revolves around the idea of
reasonable doubt as a self-defining term." Id. at 1720. Diamond argues that the subjective
meaning of reasonable doubt is:
'hardly susceptible to significant improvement by judicial efforts to define the
term with unattainable precision' and that 'attempts to explain the term ... do not
usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.' Instead, these
attempts lead to 'unnecessary confusion and a constitutionally impermissible
lessening of the required standard of proof,' which may supply 'the grounds for
unnecessary constitutional challenges.'
Id. at 1720 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
423.
Greta Proctor, Reevaluating Capital Punishment: The Fallacy of a Foolproof
System, the Focus on Reform, and the InternationalFactor, 42 GONZ. L. REv. 211, 238

(2007).
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(f)although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict,
it does not
42 4
foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt.

However, this approach was soon under
attack and subsequently became
425
out of fashion in law reform circles.
VIII. A PROPOSED HIGHER BURDEN: BEYOND A CONCEIVABLE DOUBT

The disagreement over definitions of a reasonable doubt revolves around
the clarity of such definitions and their ability to positively educate a
jury. 426 In many courts today, reasonable doubt is held to be a self-defining
term that cannot or should not be distilled into a clear and concise
statement. 427 The California Statute is representative of the states that have
a statute requiring a definition of reasonable doubt; it states, in part:
[Reasonable doubt] is not a mere possible doubt; because everything
relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It
is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that
condition that they428
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the
truth of the charge.

The purpose of such a definition is to enable the jury to make an
accurate decision based on the evidence presented. 429 Recently, a trend by
424.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(f) (1962).

425.
See Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment
and Reform of the Model Penal Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1397 (2005).
426.
See State v. Holm, 478 P.2d 284, 288 (Idaho 1970); Commonwealth v. Young,
317 A.2d 258, 262 (Pa. 1974) (only by receiving an instruction defining reasonable doubt
"can a jury fulfill its responsibility to decide the guilt or innocence of an accused"); see also
Glass, 846 F.2d at 387; Zuanich, supra note 40, at 240-41 (deriding a "no-doubt" standard
as impossible, misleading, ineffective, unnecessary, and harmful, Zuanich calls for clearer
jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt and its application to a trial). See generally
Craig Haney, Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of Perceived
Injustice in Death Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 160 (2006) ("[S]tandard
penalty phase instructions are so difficult for average people to understand and apply that
many jurors simply are unable to comprehend their most basic features."); Erik Lillquist,
Absolute Certaintyand the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.45 (2005) (theorizing that
because absolute certainty is an impossibility, proponents of the "no-doubt" standard are
really seeking a "moral" certainty standard).
427.
See, e.g., United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1988) ("'Reasonable
doubt' must speak for itself."); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The
term reasonable doubt itself has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror.").
428.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 2004). This philosophical discussion of the
human condition is repeated in several other state statutes. See also NEV. REV. STAT. §
175.211 (1986); OHfo REV. CODE ANN.§ 2901.05(B), (D) (West 2006).
429.
People v. Love, 350 P.2d 705, 709 (Cal. 1960) ("[It is the jury, not the court, that
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state legislatures to codify a definition of reasonable doubt evidences430a
need to clarify the definition and require its use in jury instructions.
However, this confusion is not simply set aside by a definition that is no
clearer than the idea itself; further, juries still make mistakes. 4 3 1 In order to
eliminate those mistakes in the sentencing of a final judgment,4 32 the
current burden of proof cannot be simplified, restated, or codified; it must
be changed.
In 2003, the new governor of Massachusetts, Mitt Romney, 4 13 formed a
council 434 for the purpose of making recommendations 4 35 to allow the
creation of a fair capital punishment statute 4 36 for the state of
Massachusetts which was narrowly tailored, and as infallible, as humanly

must be convinced of defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubts.").
430.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 546.070 (West
2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.211 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2901.05 (West 2006).

California, Missouri, Nevada, and Ohio have statutes requiring that juries are to be
instructed with a specific definition of reasonable doubt in criminal courts. Diamond, supra
note 410, at 1719. Additionally, "the highest courts of Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington, have required
that jury instructions be given defining reasonable doubt in certain circumstances." Id.at
1718.
431.
See James S. Liebman, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 78 TEX.
L. R. 1839, 1844 (2000); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, The Execution of the
Innocent. 61 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 105 (1998).

432.
Zuanich, supra note 40 (stating that juries may sentence a defendant to death even
if they have "lingering doubts" as to his guilt); Haney, supra note 426, at 160 ("The errors
are fundamental, they are made frequently, and there is no evidence that they are corrected
in the course ofjury deliberation.").
433.
See Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 2, at 143. As a Republican Candidate, Romney
promised, in his campaign, to bring back the death penalty to Massachusetts. Id. The
formation of the council was a direct outcome of this promise.
434.
MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22.
Compare Eric Felten, Rule of Law, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 24, 1996, at A15; Alex
Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, For an Honest Death Penalty, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 8,

1995 at Al 5 (discussing other reasons to question the death penalty, centered on its gender
bias and economic impact).
435.
Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 2, at 145 ("Several of the Council's proposals have
received widespread press attention and positive support from academics and
practitioners.").
436.
Id. at 144. Among the other recommendations set out by the council were: 4) New
Trial Procedures to Avoid the Problems Caused by the Use of The Same Jury for Both
Stages of a Bifurcated Capital Trial; 5) Special Jury Instructions Concerning the Use of
Human Evidence to Establish the Defendant's Guilt; 6) A Requirement of Scientific
Evidence to Corroborate the Defendant's Guilt and 10) The Creation of a Death-Penalty
Review Commission to Review Claims of Substantive error and Study the Causes of Such
error. MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 2.
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possible. 437 Among the ten specific recommendations 4 38 made by the
committee was "(7) A Heightened439Burden of Proof to Enhance the
Accuracy of Jury Decision-Making."
The council stated that at sentencing, after a defendant has been found
guilty "of capital murder 'beyond a reasonable doubt' a second, higher
burden of proof should be applied in the case of a death sentence. 440 This
second burden of Jroof
would be "the absence of any 'residual' or
'lingering' doubts" 1 held by any one juror, or by the jurors collectively,
as to the guilt of the defendant. 442 The purpose of this burden of proof
would be to preclude any defendant from being sentenced to death unless
443
there was a unanimous assent by the entire jury as to his absolute guilt.

437.

MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 3.

438.
Compare Kamin & Pokorak, supranote 2 at 144 (describing a similar commission
in Illinois which made over 100 recommendations for the improvement of Illinois's capital
punishment system). "Illinois had also, quite famously, been forced to release thirteen
condemned inmates from its death row when evidence of their innocence was brought to
light. Illinois's Governor George Ryan responded to these developments by imposing an
execution moratorium in his state." Id. at 144.
439.

MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22. For a

detailed examination of the rising danger of innocent people being put to death, including a
list of over twenty cases in which charges were dropped or acquittals were granted see
DIETER, supra note 14. See also Tara L. Swafford, Responding to Herrera v. Collins:
Ensuring That Innocents Are Not Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 603, 627-39 (1995)
(making two proposals for reducing the risk that innocents are executed); James S. Liebman,
Jeffery Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839, 1850 (2000) ("Because 'serious error' is error that
substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or death sentence imposed at
trial, each instance of that error warrants public concern.").
440.

MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22.

441.
Id.; see also Zuanich, supra note 40, at 222.
442.
MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22.
443.
Id. at 28. "Governor Romney stated that he was sufficiently confident of the
safeguards recommended that he would bet his own life on the reliability of the proposed
system." Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 2, at 145.
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Establishing the standard of an "absence of any 'residual' or 'lingering'
doubts about the defendant's guilt" 44 5 sets the burden of proof, in the
sentencing phase of the trial, as beyond a conceivable doubt; thus, a new
level of the burden of proof in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case
446
should be stated as beyond a conceivable doubt.
A sliding burden of proof in capital cases starts at the concept of
"beyond any doubt" and moves downward through "beyond conceivable
doubt" to "beyond reasonable doubt" and further on to "not guilty." Cases
involving examples of these burdens of proof show how they can be used
in an accurate determination of guilt.

444.
This chart was created by the author for the purpose of giving a visual
demonstration of the relationship between the conceivable doubt standard and other
standards. It is not intended to quantify these abstract legal standards.
445.

MASS. GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 18, at 22.

446.
See Zuanich, supra note 40, at 232-40 (decrying a "no doubt" standard as
impossible, misleading, ineffective, unnecessary, and harmful; thus a middle ground must
be found between the unwieldy "no doubt" standard and the unclear "reasonable doubt"
standard).
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FIGURE 6
Burden of Proof in Selected Capital Cases
Not Guilty

Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Gary
Grahan
(1981)
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Beyond Conceivable Doubt

Juk Ruby
(1962)
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Shootngs
(2002)

Beyond all Doubt

No Cases

Susan
Sr-th
(1995)

A. Cases in Which the Standard of Conceivable Doubt Would Be
Satisfied
In 1963, Jack Ruby shot and killed Lee Harvey Oswald in the basement
of the Dallas City Jailhouse. 44 7 In this case, unlike in most, there was no
doubt that Jack Ruby was the killer. Not only were there several
eyewitnesses present at the murder scene, but the murder was also caught
on a television broadcast and seen by "[c]ountless thousands." 448 In fact, it
has been pondered whether there was anywhere in the United States where
jurors could be found who had not witnessed the murder. 449 Ruby
confessed to the murder and eventually pled insanity as his defense. 45 0 It is

beyond any conceivable doubt that Jack Ruby shot and killed Lee Harvey
Oswald. However, even the evidence in that case would not preclude the
outside possibility that the live television coverage of the killing of Lee
Harvey Oswald was staged as part of a conspiracy to frame Ruby. Thus, as
Brian Zuanich has observed: "The no-doubt argument is based on a faulty
premise: that juries will always know for certain, after all the evidence has
been presented, whether the defendant is guilty or innocent., 45 1 It would be
unreasonable to expect this level of certainty in every capital case. The
absence of any doubt is almost impossible to find.4 52

447.

Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). Jack Ruby was

one of several names used by Jacob (Jack) Rubenstein, the infamous nightclub owner
responsible for the death of President John F. Kennedy's assassin. See id. at 796.
448.
Id.
449.
Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 125,
135 (1998).
450.
Rubenstein, 407 S.W.2d at 794.
451.
Zuanich, supra note 40, at 232; see supra Part I.
452.
Zuanich, supra note 40, at 224-25 ("[W]ithout first-hand knowledge of the facts [a
jury] can never determine, with absolute certainty, whether a defendant is guilty or
innocent."). Zuanich goes on to refute the need for a higher standard of proof; however, he
limits his discussion to the "no-doubt" standard. See id. at 224.
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In the case of the sniper shootings in Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland,
Washington, D.C., and Virginia in 2002, in which sixteen people were shot
over a forty-seven day period, 453 forensic evidence directly connected John
Allen Muhammad to the killings. 454 At the time of his arrest, Muhammad
high
was in a customized Chevy Caprice sedan 4 55 which contained a 456
velocity rifle, ammunition, maps, and items taken from earlier victims.
The rifle was positively identified as the weapon used in fourteen of the
sixteen shootings attributed to the sniper.457 Muhammad's DNA was
matched to samples found on the rifle45 and at several of the shooting
sites. 459 In addition to eyewitness testimony, a surveillance camera
captured Muhammad near the vicinity of one of the shootings. 460 The
Caprice had been modified to accommodate an individual using the trunk
as a firing platform, and was also identified by several eye witnesses as
being nearby when several of the shootings occurred. 4 6 1 As one area paper
reported, the Virginia Supreme Court found that Muhammad "acted with
'breathless cruelty' in the shootings that killed 10 people in the Washington
of
area in the fall of 2002. " 462 It is clear, given the overwhelming amount
463
doubt.
conceivable
a
beyond
guilty
was
evidence, that Muhammad
Another example is the kidnapping of Susan Smith's children on
October 25, 19 94 .464 Despite her initial deception, the case was solved
when the young mother admitted her guilt in the disappearance and deaths
453.

Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E.2d 16, 24 (Va. 2005).

454.

Id. at 24-30.

Id. at 29.
455.
Id. at 29-30.
456.
Id. at 25-29.
457.
Id. at 29 ("Inside the Caprice, police found a loaded .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle
458.
behind the rear seat. Tests determined that the DNA on the Bushmaster rifle matched the
DNA of both Malvo and Muhammad. The only fingerprints found on the Bushmaster rifle
were those of Malvo.").
Id. at 26-28.
459.
Id. at 28.
460.
Id. at 26-28.
461.
462.
Carol Morello, Va. Court Upholds Muhammad Sentences: Sniper Could Be Sent
To Another State, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at BO1 ("If society's ultimate penalty
should be reserved for the most heinous offenses, accompanied by proof of vileness or
future dangerousness, then surely, this case qualifies." (quoting Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Donald W. Lemons)).
463.
Muhammad, 619 S.E.2d at 35 ("[The] expert testimony, the evidence recovered
from the Caprice, the evidence from the 16 shootings, and the additional evidence
concerning Malvo and Muhammad's relationship and activities support the
Commonwealth's theory of the case.").
Elizabeth Gleick, It Did Happen Here: Amid New Revelations about Susan Smith,
464.
A Town Mourns Her Sons and Bracesfor the Trial, TIME MAG., Dec. 19, 1994 at Crime.
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of her children. 465 In a case that was both "sordid and ...tragic '' 466 Smith
was convicted in the drowning death of her two small boys. 467 At first she
claimed that she had been carjacked and her children abducted. 468 After
nine days of investigation, Smith finally confessed to the murders. 46 9 She
told police where they would find the children and that she was responsible
for their deaths. 470 Once her guilt in committing the crime was proven, the
question in that case became her mental state at the time the crime was
Susan Smith was sentenced to life in prison by
committed. 4 7' Ultimately,4 72
the South Carolina courts.
B. Cases in Which the Standard of Reasonable Doubt Is Satisfied
In 1981 Bobby Lambert was robbed and killed outside of a Safeway in
Houston, Texas. 473 In 2000, Gary Graham was executed by the State of
Texas for Lambert's murder. There was no physical evidence linking
Graham to the murder, thus the prosecution based its case on the testimony
of one eyewitness, Bernadine Skillern. 474 She was the only witness to
testify because "two other eyewitnesses, Wilma Amos and Daniel Grady,
were unable to do so because they did not get a good enough look at, or did
not sufficiently recall, the perpetrator's face." 4 75 Shortly before Ms.
Skillern's testimony, a hearing was held without the jury to "determine
whether her identification was 'tainted by [an] illegal line-up."' 4 76 In
addition, the defense counsel presented no evidence during the guiltinnocence phase, allowed Graham to be tried in the same clothes he was

Id.
466.
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Perspective on the Smith Trial: Emotions
Weigh on the Scales of Justice, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1995, at B9.
467.
U.S. News Year in Review - Susan Smith Trial, CNN, Dec. 28, 1995, http://www.
cnn.com/EVENTS/year-in-review/us/smith.html [hereinafter Year in Review].
465.

468.

Lawyer Says Mother Will Face Death Penalty in Drowning of Sons, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 16, 1995, at 10.
469.
470.

Id.
See id.

471.

Year in Review, supra note 467.

472.

Id.

Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1999).
473.
474.
Id. at 765. The murder weapon did not match the gun that was found on Graham
at the time of his arrest. Id. at 771.
Id. at 764.
475.
Id. at 764-65 (quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967)). "Skillern
476.
described in some detail how she had picked Graham out of a May 26, 1981 photographic
display and a May 27, 1981 police station lineup, and defense counsel raised many of the
same issues regarding suggestive identification procedures that Graham's current counsel
now brings before us." Id. at 765.
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wearing when arrested, refused to call four alibi witnesses, and refused to
allow Graham to speak in his own defense. 477 While the appellate courts in
Graham affirmed that the reasonable doubt standard had been met, a jury
required to meet a standard of beyond a conceivable doubt would almost
certainly not have imposed the death penalty.
In a similar case, Ruben Cantu was executed following a murder
conviction that was based on the testimony of the only eyewitness. 478 The
witness originally gave the police a very general and vague description of
the individual that shot his friend to death in front of him. 4 79 After failing
to identify Cantu in the first photographic line-up presented, the witness
was subjected to two more over the course of several months. 480 Today,
Juan Moreno, the man who identified Cantu, believes that he identified the
wrong man: "I'm sure it wasn't him." 4 8 1 Also, in a similar set of
circumstances, witnesses who could have provided an alibi for Cantu were
never interviewed, no physical evidence linked Cantu to the4 82crime, and the
police reports had unexplained omissions and irregularities.
Another example of a case proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but
almost certainly not proved beyond a conceivable doubt, is the conviction
of Bruno Richard Hauptmann. 4 83 In one of the most sensationalized cases
of the twentieth century, Hauptmann was tried for the kidnapping and
murder of Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr. 484 Hauptmann became a suspect in the
murder when he was found in possession of money used to pay the ransom
for the kidnapped boy. 4 85 In order to establish a link between Hauptmann
and the crime scene, a "wood expert" was brought in to examine the ladder
used to reach the young boy's bedroom window. 4 86 The expert testified
Id. at 765-66.
478.
Cantu v. State, 738 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
479.
Id. at 253. Juan Moreno described his assailant as "a Latin male between 18-20
years of age" wearing blue jeans. Id.
Id. at 251. Moreno changed his statements to the police officers, at times stating
480.
the defendant's name but refusing to identify his picture and later identifing his picture, but
stating that he did not know the man's name. Id.
477.

Lise Olsen, The Cantu Case: Death And Doubt, Did Texas Execute An Innocent
481.
Man?, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 20, 2005, at Al.
482.

Id.

483.

State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935). One of the many issues appealed by

Hauptmann's attorneys was the burden of proof. "The court by its charge impaired a free
verdict and impressed upon the jury his conclusions as to the evidence and imposed upon
the defendant an unauthorized rule as to reasonable doubt." Id. at 820.
484.

Id. at 813.

485.
Id. at 826. In fact, $14,600 was found at Hauptmann's residence. Id. His story that
it had been left by his ex-business partner before he left for Germany was never given any
credence by the police. Id.
486.
Id. The ladder was homemade and it was believed that the kidnapper built the
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that scraps of wood found at Hauptmann's home matched exactly the
ladder found at the Lindbergh home. 487 Other evidence included
Hauptmann's limp for several days after the kidnapping; 488 a tool found at
the crime scene matching a tool that was missing from Hauptmann's tool
chest; 489 and the fact that Hauptmann's handwriting matched the ransom
note. 490 Hauptmann was sentenced to death on a charge of guilty beyond a
4 9 1 even though no evidence
reasonable doubt,
conclusively placed him at
492
the crime scene.

The case of Roger Keith Coleman is an example of a case where a man
was sentenced to death beyond a reasonable doubt. 493 After his sentencing,
and until the time of his death, Coleman protested his innocence. 494 A
movement was launched to prove his innocence and obtain his release,
which culminated with his picture on the cover of Time magazine. 495 496
In
1982, Coleman was convicted of raping and murdering his sister-in-law.
The evidence weighed heavily against him; however, it was not
conclusive. 497 While Coleman's hair was found on the victim's body, and
ladder at home. Id.
487.
Id. The wood used to make the ladder was traced back to a lumberyard in
Hauptmann's neighborhood. Id.
488.
Id. The ladder was broken, and it was conjectured by the prosecution that the
kidnapper had been injured and the baby killed when the ladder broke as he was making his
exit. There was no forensic evidence to support this hypothesis. Id. at 816.
489.
Id.
490.
Id. Other "exact" matches to Hauptmann's handwriting, including an
incriminating phone number, were later proven to be forgeries. Id.
491.
Id. at 826-27.
492.
In affirming the conviction, the Court relied on the testimony regarding the
ransom money, handwriting, and ladder, but not on evidence actually placing Hauptmann at
the Lindbergh home. See id. at 826.
493.
See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (Va. 1983). The capital
murder statute of Virginia does not permit a relaxed evidentiary standard applicable to the
penalty phase of a capital murder trial; rather, the statute expressly provides that the
"Commonwealth must prove the existence of one or both aggravating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt." Powell v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537, 555 (Va. 2004) (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (2003)).
494.
Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Executed Man by
Va., WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006 at AOl [hereinafter DNA Tests] (noting that Coleman
proclaimed his innocence even as he was strapped into the electric chair).
495.
Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, Warner Orders DNA Testing In Case of Man
Executed in '92, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2006 at AOl.
496.
Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 865-77 (stating that although the evidence against
Coleman was entirely circumstantial, the court nonetheless found that the decision was not
reversible error).
497.
Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992 at 40. "The evidence - or
lack of it - raised doubts about [Coleman's] guilt." Id.
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blood of the same type of the victim's was found
on his clothing, DNA
498
tests of semen implicated more than one person.
In 1990, new DNA tests seemed to prove Coleman's guilt, placing him
in the two percent of the population who could have committed the
crime.4 99 After his execution in May, 1992, advocates continued to lobby
for more extensive and new DNA testing in order to prove Coleman's
innocence.500 After being rebuffed by the Virginia Supreme Court, the
advocates' wishes were finally granted by the governor in January 2006.501
These new tests determined that there was only a one-in-nineteen-million
chance that the semen found at the crime scene was not Coleman's, 50 2 thus
certainly meeting a standard of beyond a conceivable doubt.
C. Cases in Which the Standard of Reasonable Doubt
Was Satisfied,
50 3
and the Innocent Were Nearly Put To Death
In September 1995, Judge Frank H. Seay, after reviewing the case of
death row inmate Ron Williamson, reversed the conviction and granted him
a new trial. 504 At the end of his opinion he wrote the following:
While considering my decision in this case, I told a friend, a layman, I
believed the facts and the law dictated that I must grant a new trial to a
man who had been convicted and sentenced to death. My friend asked,
"Is he a murderer?" I replied simply, "We won't know until he receives
a fair trial." God help us, if ever in this great country we turn our heads
while people who have
not had fair trials are executed. That almost
50 5
happened in this case.
The nearly complete lack of physical evidence, 50 6 the new technology of
498.
Coleman, 307 S.E.2d at 867-68.
499. DNA Tests, supra note 494, at AO1.
500.
Glod & Shear, supra note 495, at A01.
501.
Richard Willing, DNA Tests Could Show ifVa. Executed an Innocent Man, USA
TODAY, Dec. 23, 2005, at 3A.
502.
DNA Tests, supra note 494, at AO1.
503.
See generally, Innocence After "Guilt," supra note 4 ("Punishment of the
innocent may be the worst of all injustices." (quoting Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463,
472 (S.D. 1999)). See also Death Penalty Info. Ctr., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last

visited Jan. 30, 2008).
504. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Okla. 1995).
505. Id. at 1576-77. This excerpt is taken from the epilogue Judge Seay wrote
following the conclusion to his decision. The inclusion of an epilogue, especially one so
colloquial, is highly unusual.

506. Id. at 1552-53. The physical evidence was limited to hair evidence taken at the
scene that was microscopically consistent with a sample given by Williamson. Id. Hair
analysis is unreliable at best, and though experts can not even agree on a consistent error
rate, studies have shown such rates as high as sixty-seven percent. Id at 1556 (citing Edward
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DNA testing, 50 7 and the introduction of new evidence 5 08 eventually led to
the exoneration of Ron Williamson for the rape and murder of Debra Sue
Carter. 50 9 He was released in 1999, having been on death row, for a crime
he did not commit, for over ten years. 51 Williamson came within two
weeks of execution before a stay was granted.5 1' Perhaps the most
shocking aspect of Williamson's case, however, is not his complete
innocence or how close he came to the death chamber; rather, it is how
often this same set of circumstances has and continues to happen. In the
past thirty-three years, over 120 people have been released
from death row
5 12
innocence.
their
of
evidence
of
introduction
the
upon
In 1985, John Thompson was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death.5 13 Fourteen years later, just five weeks before his scheduled
execution, Thompson's lawyer uncovered new evidence that later led to a
new trial at which he was acquitted of all charges. 514 Initially, Thompson's

J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the Underemployment of
Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 41, 41-44 (1982)).
507.
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Innocence List, Cases of Innocence 1973-Present,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org [hereinafter The Innocence List] (follow "Innocence"
hyperlink; then follow "Description of Each Innocence Case" hyperlink; then follow "19942003" hyperlink) (last updated Dec. 6, 2007); see also Innocence After "Guilt, " supra note
4, at 162 (stating that "[iun more than one hundred cases over the past twelve years, DNA
evidence has been utilized in the postconviction [sic] stage to prove 'beyond any doubt' that
the convicted individual never committed the crime.").
508.
Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1549-52. Such evidence included the felony
convictions and subsequent plea bargains offered to Glen Gore, a key witness; the fact that
Teri Holland, a "witness" to the confession of Williamson, also heard the "confession" of
another man convicted of murder, and had received a plea bargain of charges against her in
exchange for her testimony in both cases; and that another person, Ricky Joe Simmons, had
since confessed to the murder. Id.
509.
The Innocence List, supra note 507. In total, Williamson asserted seventeen
grounds for relief. Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1535. The one treated at most length was the
issue of his competency to stand trial. Williamson had a long history of mental illness, and
the fact that this was never brought up during his trial, by either the prosecution or the
defense, was an important factor in the decision to review his trial. Id. at 1529.
510.
The Innocence List, supra note 507.
511.
Frontline: Burden of Innocence (PBS television broadcast May 1, 2003)
(transcript), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/etc/script/html.
512.

FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 2 (providing statistics for

only those people exonerate from death row); cf Innocence after "Guilt," supra note 4, at
162 (stating that over one-hundred exonerations have been granted in the last twelve years
simply on DNA evidence).
513.
Louisiana v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 553 (La. 2002).
514.
Id. An investigator discovered microfilmed records that showed that the State had
withheld blood identification evidence in an armed robbery case in which Thompson had
been convicted of attempted armed robbery. Id. The evidence conclusively proved that
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death sentence was vacated and a life sentence was imposed. 5 15 New
evidence was produced with allowed a retrial to be granted for Thompson.
able to take the stand in his own defense and was
During this retrial he was
5 16
acquitted of all charges.
Anthony Porter was convicted of a double murder in 1983 which was
finally reversed in March of 1999.517 He received a stay in 1998, just days
before his scheduled execution, so that the Supreme Court could determine
his mental competency.5 15819The conviction was reversed after another man
confessed to the murders.
In a truly close call, Joseph Green Brown received a stay of execution
thirteen hours before he was scheduled to be executed. 520 His original
Thompson was not guilty of that crime. Id. The State had used the attempted armed robbery
conviction as an aggravating circumstance to support Thompson's death sentence. Id.
515.
Id. In late 1999:
[Thompson] filed . . . an application for post conviction relief.

. .

raising five

claims: (1) he was denied his right to testify at trial because of the existence of the
prior attempted armed robbery conviction, which had been the product of
misconduct by the State; (2) he was denied his right to present a defense because
he could not testify due to the existence of the attempted armed robbery
conviction; (3) the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (4) his due process rights
had been violated due to the egregious conduct of the State; and (5) at a minimum,
his death sentence should be vacated because it was based upon his attempted
armed robbery conviction, which had been set aside. The court heard the matter
on October 26, 2000, and on May 26, 2001 the court denied the application as to
the first degree murder conviction but vacated the death sentence and imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment.
Id.
Press Release, Brenda Bowser, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., La. Man is Nation's
516.
108th Death Row Exoneree (May 9, 2003), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/PR-DPIC
108.pdf.
517.
Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C.L. REV. 61, 79 n.61 (2004).
518.
Id. at 95.
The courts allowed him to live only because there was evidence he had a low
mental capacity, low enough to raise questions about whether he was even eligible
to be executed. On this basis, and this basis alone, an Illinois court was willing to
grant a last minute stay, and then only to explore mental capacity.

Id.
519.
Id. "After a court granted Porter's stay of execution, some college students and a
private investigator took on his case and ended their investigation by videotaping the real
killer confessing to the crime." Id.; see also Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence,
2006 Wis. L. REV. 237, 245-46 (2006) (discussing the effect of the Miranda decision on
confessions obtained under police interrogation, Rosen states "interrogations are still secret,
carried on away from the eyes and ears of everyone but those asking and those answering
police questions").
520.
The Innocence List, supra note 507 (follow "1984-1993" hyperlink).
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conviction of murder, rape and robbery was later overturned because it was
found that the state "knowingly allowed material false testimony to be
introduced at trial.", 52 1 The state also knowingly exploited that testimony in
its closing arguments. 522 Because of the lack of physical evidence linking
Brown to the scene of the crime the case against Brown hinged on the
testimony of one Ronald Floyd, who stated that he was with Brown shortly
before and after the crimes were committed.523 As was later revealed,
Floyd was given immunity in exchange for his testimony against Brown, a
fact about which he lied during the trial.5 2" This lie was further
compounded when the prosecuting attorney, in his closing arguments,
recited the fact that Floyd had received no promises or incentives for his
testimony, even though the prosecutor knew that statement to be false. 525
Although not all death penalty cases are as close as Brown's, the lack of

521.
Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11 th Cir. 1986).
We need not develop the facts concerning the plea agreement with Floyd relating
to the motel robbery. There is evidence that an agreement was reached on this
offense in October 1973, eight months before the Barksdale trial and before
negotiations began for an agreement concerning the Barksdale case. At the time of
the Barksdale trial Floyd had not been sentenced in the motel robbery case. As set
out in the testimony . . . Floyd denied any knowledge of why he had not been
sentenced. After the Barksdale trial, on pleas of guilty, Floyd and Brown were
sentenced for the motel robbery. Floyd was given probation. Brown got 20 years
...
. But we do not base our decision upon the testimony concerning the
agreement relating to the motel case, since the false testimony relating to the
Barksdale case agreement, and the prosecutions misrepresentation of it, require
granting the writ.
Id. at 1461.
522.
Id. at 1458, 1460 ("In his closing argument to the jury the prosecutor used Floyd's
denial of any promises to bolster Floyd's testimony.").
523.
Id. at 1458-59.
According to Floyd's testimony ....

Floyd waited in the car .

while the other

two entered the store ....
About 15 minutes later Floyd went to the door of the
shop to look in, heard a shot, entered the store and saw the foot of a body lying on
the floor. . . . Floyd also testified that the next day he, Brown, and Raymond
Vinson were together and heard a radio broadcast concerning the . . . murder.
Floyd said something like "People will do anything these days." Brown
responded, "Yes, she never should have done what she did." Vinson's testimony
corroborated this conversation. Later that day, Floyd testified, he asked Brown
outright whether he had killed "the woman".... Brown responded "Yes," and
followed the answer with a crude sexual remark to the effect that he had had
intercourse with her."
Id.
524.
525.

Id. at 1460, 1464.
Id. at 1460.
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evidence in his case and many others brings clearly into focus a need for a
higher burden of proof in death penalty sentences. If Brown could be
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, even though he was in fact framed, it
should be obvious that changes need to be made. And even though Brown's
conviction was overturned in 1987,526 this problem is still relevant today.
The charges against Ron Williamson and Anthony Porter were dismissed in
1999,527 and John Thompson was acquitted in 2003.528 In the most recent
case, John Ballard was convicted of a double murder in 2003 and sentenced
to death. 529 His conviction was overturned in 2006 for a lack of
evidence. 530 In its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the State
could never meet its burden of proof at trial.53 1 With these kinds of
convictions being handed down as recently as 2003, it is apparent that
concerns over questionable convictions are a continuing concern.
IX. CONCLUSION

In order to more accurately and aptly apply capital punishment, a
bifurcated system including a higher burden of proof in the sentencing
phase is needed. A burden of proof in a death penalty case requiring that
guilt be proved "beyond any doubt" is an impossible and impractical
burden, tantamount to abolishing the death penalty in its entirety. The
standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt," now adopted in all states
with a death penalty, and in the federal courts, is too low a standard in that
it leaves open the possibility of an innocent person being put to death by
the state. Indeed, there is persuasive evidence that this has already
occurred. A standard of "beyond a conceivable doubt" is the standard best
suited to ensure that no innocent person is ever executed, while at the same
time not imposing an impossible burden of proof that would be tantamount
to abolishing the death penalty.

526.

The Innocence List, supra note 507.

527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

Id. (follow "1994-2003" hyperlink).
Id. (follow "1994-2003" hyperlink).
Id. (follow "2004-Present" hyperlink).
Id. (follow "2004-Present" hyperlink).
Ballard v. State, 923 So. 2d. 475, 485 (Fla. 2006).

